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INTRODUCTION
The rapid influx of homesteaders into Montana after 
1909 caused a dramatic change in the structure of the entire 
state. This change revolved around the dryland farming pro­
cedures undertaken on scant 320 acre plots. The newcomers 
to the Great Plains region built small communities criss­
crossed by a patchwork of railroads. These honyockers al­
tered not only the state*s transportation system, but its 
politics, agriculture, educational institutions and banking 
facilities.
From 1917 to 1925 the state underwent still further 
change due to the drought conditions. These dry years were 
not confined to Montana but occurred in North and South 
Dakota, Idaho, and portions of Wyoming and Washington. The 
catastrophe was very complex, but its most significant aspect 
was the massive failure of hundreds of banks. These banks 
left thousands of homesteaders penniless, forcing them to 
migrate from the Great Plains destitute and with broken spirits.
No historian has ever chronicled this tragedy in its 
entirety. Its very complexity— drought, falling beef and 
wheat prices, loss of European markets, uncontrolled bank 
failures, years of despair and the subsequent disenchantment 
of the farmers— has made such a study extremely difficult.
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Until each facet of this disaster has been thoroughly re­
searched no historian can accurately write the whole story. 
This thesis is one example of such research and is confinad 
to a single aspect of that cataclysm— the failure of one of 
Montana's commercial banks.
No history has ever been written that involved the 
failure of a Montana bank during this era. After a bank 
failed its papers and correspondence were burned. Conse­
quently, historians have been forced to rely on state bank­
ing records. For this single reason the Gilman State Bank 
Papers are of major importance.
In evaluating the failure of the Gilman bank several 
essential questions must be answered. Why did the bank fail 
Did it fail for primarily the same reasons other Montana 
banks failed? If so, can this failure be considered repre­
sentative of the majority of the banks in the state? Once 
these questions are answered generalizations can be made 
concerning other banks that folded in Montana during the 
1920*s. These generalizations are important if one is to 
attempt even a brief understanding of the failure of a s.ingl 
institution. More importantly the cost of human emotion can 
be examined and the effects it rendered can be applied to 
other bank studies.
The first chapter is a terse explanation about the 
homesteaders and how they got to Montana. The chapter takes
3
into account the effect these newcomers had on the state’s 
banking system. Conversely, the failure of these institu­
tions forced bankruptcy on thousands of inexperienced farmers. 
This groundwork is essential for the reader to even hazard a 
guess at why a bank failed. The chapters which follow deal 
explicitly with the social, economic, loan and financial 
factors that caused the bank’s failure.
This thesis does not presume to give the answers to all 
of the questions raised concerning the failure of Montana’s 
banks. This is the study of a single bank. The conclusions 
reached, however, can hopefully be applied to other banks 
that closed. With these answers another piece can be fitted 
into a puzzle of mammoth proportions.
Jeffrey L. Cuoniff 
October, 1971
CHAPTER I
RAINBOW’S END: HONYOCKER YEARS
OF PROSPERITY AND BANKRUPTCY
I
They were called ’’homesteaders, ” ”nesters,” ’’scissor- 
bills,’’ "honyockers,” and a dozen other names. But no 
matter which title they were known by they came to Montana 
with hope for a new and prosperous life. This was the 
attitude of thousands of easterners and European immigrants 
who settled in Montana during the homestead era (1909-1925). 
These newcomers to the West came with little knowledge 
about their new homes, but soon became indoctrinated to 
the rugged life of prairie farming. Hope and despair be­
came their watchwords and Montana’s history during this 
period is filled with accounts of their struggles and tri­
umphs. The homesteader had arrived!
’’Some of them were chasing a rainbow; some of them 
thought they were getting ’free land.’ And almost all of 
them had been subjected to a promotion and propaganda cam­
paign of great proportions.”^ Advertisements depicted Montana 
as the land of milk and honey where the poor man had an
^K. Ross Toole, Montana: An Uncommon Land (Norman,
Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1959), 230. Hereafter
cited as Toole, Montana: An Uncommon Land.
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equal opportunity in developing his fortune. One particu­
lar poster widely displayed throughout the East showed a
plow being drawn across a Montana field fuming over a fur-
9 *row of golden coins. This was quite typical of advertising 
used to entice these newcomers to move west and settle in 
Montana's paradise.
The railroads played a major role in stimulating in­
terest in western agriculture. "Usually the literature con­
tained an endorsement by the governor and an agricultural 
official as to productive value of eastern Montana lands, 
and alluring illustrations of various phases of farming, 
new buildings, farm equipment, and livestock.
The Milwaukee Railroad, through its poster and pamphlet 
campaigp, achieved great success in bringing thousands of 
immigrants to eastern and central Montana. One of these 
pamphlets emphasized the exceptionally good soil in the 
Deer Lodge Valley region. It vividly described the rich 
black soil that ranged in depth from ten inches to ten feet. 
The brochure did not fail to mention the rich elements in
^Carl Newton Abbott, Montana in the Making (Billings, 
Mont.: The Gazette Printing Company, 1934)> 385-6. Here­
after cited as Abbott, Montana in the Making.
^Charles A. Dalich, "Dry Farming Promotion in Eastern 
Montana: 1907-1916” (unpublished MA thesis, Archives,
University of Montana, 1968), 58. Hereafter cited as
Dalich, "Dry Farming Promotion, 1907-1916."
the soil (oxygen, nitrogen, potash, etc.) and its capa­
bility of producing enormous yields of winter wheat, oats, 
barley, flax and field peas without any appreciable exhaustion 
of the soil.^
Another booklet published by the Milwaukee described 
the climate of Montana as one of the most healthful in the 
world. It stated that "...there were few days during the en­
tire year in which outdoor work could not be done in comfort," 
and stressed that "...no one need fear the winters of Montana.
The Northern Pacific, with its vast land acquisitions, 
offered many immigrants an opportunity for a new life on 
cheap rich land. The land grant which the government made 
to the Northern Pacific gave the railroad the title to 
every other section (all the odd-numbered sections) for 
twenty miles each side of the right-of-way. The railroad 
sold its odd-numbered sections to land companies who in turn 
found it easy to sell to settlers since many of the even- 
numbered sections had already been settled. Townships 
rapidly populated in this manner.
^Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway, "The Deer 
Lodge Valley" (Chicago: Poole Bros. Railway Printers, n.d.),
•^Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway, "Montana:
Its Resources and Opportunities" (Chicago: Poole Bros.
Railway Printers, n.d.), 4.
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The Great Northern, plotted by the visions of Jim 
Hill, opened the state to farming on the northern plains. 
HillTs success can be measured by the fact that homestead­
ers settled 42 percent of Montana from 1910 to 1922, (80 
percent of which was unfit for grain c r o p s ) A s  one noted 
Montana author put it, "Montana, was after all Jim Hill’s 
state."^ This, however, may be stretching a little far the 
importance of one man’s ventures and his effect on the 
settlement of Montana.
In any case, the importance of the railroads in bring­
ing homesteaders to the state cannot be overlooked. They 
came in cars which carried livestock. Some even traveled 
as stowaways. The majority of them, though, came on immi­
grant trains. "The honyocker rented a freight car (St. Paul
Joseph Kinsey Howard, Montana; High. Wide, and Hand­
some (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943)* 168-9.
Hereafter cited as Howard, Montana: High. Wide, and Hand­
some . In these dozen years the rural population of every 
county except Broadwater, Park, and Lewis and Clark more 
than doubled. Abbott, Montana in the Making. 33 7.
^Ibid. It was Joseph Kinsey Howard’s contention that 
Jim Hill’s vision of the settlement of the northern plains 
had come true. In 1912 at Havre’s annual fair Hill explained 
his vision. He told those startled citizens that the time 
had come for the settlement of a farm family on every 160 
or 320 acre plot within the millions of acres of Montana’s 
public domain. Howard maintained that Hill’s vision was so 
successful that all Montanans (the farmers and stockmen in 
the northern portion of the state in particular) were help­
lessly dependent on the railroad.
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to eastern Montana, $50) and in it he was permitted to
place fa"ll second hand articles such as household goods,
machinery, agr:i cultural implements, vehicles, wagons, tools,
etc.’ Small livestock (sheep and hogs) not exceeding 20
head and lar^e stock (cattle, horses, and mules) not over
10 head were also permitted.”8 In some instances the trip
to Montana was a bit crowded.
Local and state organizations also participated in
attracting homesteaders to Montana. They extolled the
abundant rainfall of the region and conveniently failed to
mention the sub-zero temperatures and cold winds that were
common to Montana winters. Neither did these groups explain
about the recurring droughts or the condition of the soil
when the land became parched due to the lack of rain. One
such alluring description of Montana’s excellent climate
appeared in a pamphlet distributed in 1904 by the Montana
World’s Fair Commission in St. Louis:
Because of the dryness of the atmosphere even 
the ocfcasional extreme cold is not severely felt, 
nor is the warm weather of the summer at all dis­
agreeable. In fact in the summer months Montana 
is one great pleasure and health resort, while 
its Indian summers, extending generally well 
towards the Christmas holidays, are incomparable.9
" ' —    • 1 ' T"
8Ibid., 181
^Montana World’s Fair Commission, ’’Montana the Treasure 
State,” ed. by John W. Read (St. Louis: Con P. Curran Print­
ing Co., 1904), 7. The state issued this pamphlet under
the direction of Montana’s World’s Fair Commission for free 
distribution at St. Louis during the Louisiana Purchase 
Exposition of 1904.
9
Another leaflet, released i n •1908 about the city of 
Great Falls, claimed that its population was increasing 
more rapidly than at any time in its history. City fathers 
believed that the community would reach a population of fif­
ty thousand in five years.-*-15 The city, in fact, did not 
attain that population until fifty years later.
The Enlarged Homestead Act of 1909 also encouraged 
settlers to migrate. westward. This act doubled the acreage 
allotment from 160 to 320 acres. In 1912 the "Three-year 
Homestead Law" cut the proving-up time from five to three 
years. In addition the owner could be absent five months 
each year from the claim.
One group that attested to the success of this adver­
tising barrage and the passage of the Homestead Acts was 
the speculators. At every train stop there was a land 
office, and a "land locator," as they liked to be called, 
met each newly arriving train. Rushed to the land office, 
the locator quickly persuaded the honyocker to file on his 
new c l a i m . " T h e n  a wagon or backboard, loaded with pro-
■^Great Falls Chamber of Commerce, "Great Falls and the Midland Empire" (Great Falls: W. T. Ridgley Calendar
Co., 1908), 5» The population of Great Falls was .13 .943
in 1910; 24.121 in 1920; 28.822 in 1930; 29.928 in 1940;
39 o 214 in 1950; and 5 5.357 in I960. Population statistics 
were from the U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the 
Census, Eighteenth Census of the United States. I960: 
Population, I, 10.
^^The homesteader paid a $22 filing fee for a 320 acre 
claim, $16 for a 160 acre plot, and $5 for an 80 acre claim. 
Montana Bureau of Agriculture, Labor and Industry, The Re- 
sources and Opportunities of Montana (Helena: State Publish-
ing~*Co "T9T9Tj 2TI Hereafter cited as Montana*s Resources.
:io
visions, barrels of water and a plow, would pull up out­
side. A homeseeker was urged to pay the fee ^usuaH y  from 
$25 to $50/ and get ’expert’ assistance in locating the 
best land.”
It was not unusual for a speculator to locate five 
or six claims in a day. They made a good living in this 
way and most of them were quite honest. However, some of 
these men only wanted to get rich, and at the honyocker’s 
expense. These unscrupulous speculators quite often lo­
cated more than one homesteader on the same claim.
Once located the newcomer quickly plowed the ground 
for cultivation and chose a suitable site for his new home. 
Some of the dwellings that the honybcker’s built resembled 
the sod houses on the Kansas and Nebraska plains. However, 
most of the homes were 10 x 12 shacks with tar roofs and 
no foundation. In the winter time dirt and snow had to be 
piled up outside along the sides to prevent the cold from 
coming under the walls. Even old rags stuffed into cracks 
could not stop the cold air from piercing the dwelling and 
nothing could prevent the window frames from warping.
The wind was the worst enemy. It shook the small 
shacks with fury and the earthen floors became extremely 
cold. The stove, usually located in one corner of the
12Mabel Lux, "Honyockers of Harlem, Scissorbills of 
Zurich.” Montana Magazine of History, September, 1963, 6 .
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house, provided the only heat. Since wood was so scarce 
the homesteaders utilized cow dung and hay which gave off 
a rancid odor. Continual attention had to be given to 
keeping the fire going.
The problem of water w^s a major one, for only a few 
homes had ideal locations close to streams. Most of the 
water was hauled by barrel. This was often a half day 
or an all day task depending on how far the water had to 
be carried. Those that were fortunate enough to afford it 
hired someone to dig a well. When one could not afford it 
he dug his own. "This was not so bad in low-lands, but 
often enough he had to go down two or three hundred feet 
with a pick and shovel while his wife hauled up the dirt
with a windlass.
In the winter many farmers left their wives and children 
to find jobs in neighboring towns. These courageous women 
had to rely on themselves and it toughened their spirits.
The howling wind, the cold, the close quarters of the 
small shacks, and the loneliness were only a few of the 
problems with which they had to contend. Many did not 
survive and those that did persuaded their husbands to 
give up everything on their new homesteads to return east.
"^Toole, Montana: An Uncommon Land. 231-2. This
was a common method of well digging for the poorer home­
steaders. The process was slow and quite often the results 
proved unfavorable, but water was a necessity and every
12
From 19X0 to 1918 Montana's farmers prospered. The 
need for wheat during World War I pushed the price of wheat 
to $2 a bushel. The price of land doubled and Montanans 
could see no end to the rising price of grain. The home­
steaders borrowed money to buy more land and better equip­
ment. Bankers loaned money freely because land was used as 
collateral. There was speculation that wheat might jump 
to $4 a bushel before 1920. Why shouldnft the banker help 
the farmer and also reap some of these benefits? The banks 
borrowed from eastern capital at 6 percent. They loaned 
to the honyockers at 10 percent and secured a good profit.
In the years. 1915 to 1920 the national income doubled.
No where was this more pronounced than in agriculture. 
According to the Agricultural Department the farm income in 
1919 had reached a level that was double that of the five 
years preceding the war. This increase in farm income was 
due to the 100 percent increase in the prices farmers re­
ceived for their produce.^ Steadily rising prices for 
farm land and increased farm loans also reflected the post­
war speculation of rising grain prices.
means possible was exhausted to obtain this precious com­modity. But, a hole dug by hand three hundred feet into 
the soil is practically impossible, if not absurd, and Dr. 
Toole has committed a grave error of over-exaggeration on 
this point. For a good description of early Montana well 
digging see, nThe Last of the Homesteaders," by John Talbot 
Graham in The Montana Magazine of History, April 1968, 62-75*
^Paul W. McCracken, The Northwest in Two Wars (Minn­eapolis: The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, n.d.), 2. 
Hereafter cited as McCracken, The Northwest in Two Wars.
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The global recession began in the summer of 1920 and 
prices dropped drastically. Grain prices declined 66 per­
cent in the ensuing 15 months and meat prices fell 60 per-
1 ccent. J The recession affected not only whole communities 
but the entire country.
Still another calamity dispelled the small hopes held 
by the Great Plains farmers. "When the drought came, it 
did not come all at once or in all places at the same time. 
Drought is a little like cancer; it seems to spread outward 
until it encompasses everything. 'Everyone was hit hard 
when the rains ceased to fall. The farmers could not meet 
the payments on their equipment. Cattlemen had difficulty 
in paying their feed bills. Local merchants had to extend 
credit to these people or file for bankruptcy themselves. 
Affected by all these groups were the banks. They continued 
to lend money while looking at the sky in desperation wait­
ing for the rain to come.
No one could understand it. From the turn of the 
twentieth century to 1916, Montana yielded an average of 
25 bushels of wheat to the acre. By 1919, the third year 
of the drought, the average was only 2.4 bushels. ^  In 
July of that year Governor S. V. Stewart called a special
^ ̂ Ibid . , 6 .
1^T°°le, Montana; An Uncommon Land. 235.
17Howard, Montana; High. Wide, and Handsome. 197*
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session of the Montana legislature to consider the agri­
cultural emergency.
Despite these meager crop yields the worst was yet to 
come. The topsoil blew away. The farmer’s plow had cut 
so deeply into the soil (sometimes up to a foot) it- took only 
a slight wind to carry it away. Prairie fires, quite com­
mon during these dry spells, roared across the dry land with 
abandon. Wells even dried up.
If the farmer somehow managed to survive all this and
cultivated even a small crop he could look forward to still
another disaster— the grasshoppers. When these black
clouds of insects swept across the land there was very
little left in their wake. They even devoured the stubble
leaving nothing to hold the soil.
From 1921-1925 one half of all the farmers lost their
land through bankruptcy and foreclosure. From 1926-1929
there were ten thousand more farm foreclosures. Non-resi-r
dent foreclosures made up approximately one-fourth of this 
1 8total. This cut land value in half. The farmers that 
did remain through these years continued to borrow to 
plant more seeds and buy better equipment to insure larger 
yields.
This vicious cycle of borrowing and living on credit 
ended with the collapse of over half of Montana’s banks
l8Ibid., 207-8 .
IQby 1926. Thousands of the state’s farmers and their 
families left in disappointment. These people had been 
choked with despair. They remembered the good times of 
Montana's boom era— its rain and its prosperity. Most 
vivid in their minds, though, were the hard times. Many 
Montanans had little sympathy for the homesteader. They 
were skeptical of his way of living. When he could not 
conquer nature and all of its unpredictable elements they 
felt he had brought it on himself.
No matter what his treatment, by man or by nature, 
the honyocker secured for himself a place in Montana’s 
history. For those farmers that remained the wet and 
dry cycles continued through the thirties and forties.
The value of land also fluctuated accordingly. These 
diehards had survived harder times and would not quit.
The homesteaders that did not survive the bitter years of 
the twenties had little to show for it. Many of them 
came to Montana with only a small savings. They left 
with nothing, except the memory of their struggle against 
impossible odds and their dreams of prosperity they brought 
with them.
"^In 1920 Montana had 396 state and national commer­
cial banks in operation. Within six years 214 of those 
banks closed their doors either by suspending their opera­
tion, voluntarily liquidating, or placing the banks in the 
hands of receivers. These figures were compiled from the 
records of bank statements in the Annual Report of the 
Banking Department, State of Montana for the fiscal years 
ending, Nov. 30, 1920, and June 30, 1926, and the Abstract 
of Reports of the Condition of M ontana State Banks. Trust 
Companies. Private and National Banks. Nov. 15, 1920, 
and June 30, 1926.
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II
The rapid settlement of Montana from 1910 to 1920 
created an uncontrolled hysteria in the expansion of the 
stateTs banking facilities. Montana’s population increased 
from 376*000 to 549*000 during this period— an addition 
of 173*000 inhabitants. Rain was plentiful and the First 
World War doubled the price of wheat. The honyockers* 
encouraged by private and public organizations* bought 
more land and machinery. It became the farmer’s patriotic 
duty to raise food for the war. Consequently, the number 
of farms in the state doubled and land value soared from 
$250*000,000 in 1910 to the 1920 total of $700,000,000 .20
To accommodate this new found wealth the chartering 
of 397 banks occurred from 1910 to 1919* three-fourths of 
which were state banks. In 1919 alone, the state chartered
an incredibly high number of 82 banks* both state and fed-
21eral. ’’The number of banks in the United States reached 
its highest point in 1921 with more than 30,500. Of these, 
3*8 25 were in the Ninth Federal Reserve District (Montana,
20John H. Toole, "Montana Agriculture and the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis* 1917 to .1925n (unpublished 
paper, Archives, University of Montana* n.d.)* 4» Hereafter
cited as Toole, "Montana Agriculture, 1917-1925
21 Clarence Groth, "Sowing and Reaping: Montana Banking,
1910-1925* "Montana Magazine of History, October 1970, 30.
Hereafter.cited as Groth* "Montana Banking, 1910-1925.
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North Dakota, South Dakota and Minnesota). This is almost 
three times the present number today.1,22
To say that Montana was heavily overbanked at that 
time is an understatement. Obtaining a bank charter in 
the state was not a difficult task. There was a minimum 
capital requirement of $20,000 for a state bank in 1910. 
This money could be placed in the bankTs own treasury.
The law, amended in 1915, tightened controls and made it 
a requirement that the $20,000. be deposited in a different
bank.
The requirements for bank charters were not strict ' 
and any small community could obtain a bank. The town 
of Agawam, for example, which had only 50 people, procured 
a charter in November, 1912, in hopes of being on a rail­
road line. The charter was never activated because the 
line terminated at that point.24
Some towns, little more than drinking holes, had a 
bank in the community. A few of these little known towns 
included Toston, Vanada, Lothair, Savoy, Kolin, Coburg
2 2 *Dick Heiber and Clement Van Nice, (paper presented 
before the joint meeting of the Board of Directors of the 
Minneapolis and Helena office of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Minneapolis on Oct. 15, 1966, Archives, University of 
Montana). Hereafter cited as Heiber and Van Nice, paper 
presented before Federal Reserve Bank members, Oct. 15, 
1966.
2^Groth, "Montana Banking, 1910-1925," 30.
24Ibii.
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and Madoc. All of the banks in these locations acquired
charters after 1913 and were either liquidated or placed
into receivership by 1925*
The town of Medicine Lake (population 300) had three
banks in 1923, two chartered in 1911 and one in 1912. Two
of them failed in 1923, less than a month apart, and the
third no longer exists. "To serve a total population of
about 37,500 in Fergus, Hill, Sheridan and Valley counties
in 1920, there were 8 5 banks (about one for each 440 per-
2 5sons— against a 1920 national average of one to 3,500).”
Only eight banks survived.
One reason for so many small towns was the emotional 
fever over county splitting. County splitting groups 
quickly organized when the population surged. These new 
counties meant more towns, additional businesses, and in­
creased employment. It also meant more public officials, 
construction of county buildings, and a larger state and 
county budget to run these agencies. For this, new taxes 
had to be levied. This growth was fine until the honyockers 
experienced the drought and its hardships. For those that 
remained, taxes rose— as high as 140 percent an acre in 
some c o u n t i e s . R e a d y  cash was no longer available and 
living on credit became a stark reality.
25Ibid.
2^K. Ross Toole, "Montana: A Twentieth Century Por­
trait” (unpublished manuscript, Archives, University of Montana, 1971), 61. Hereafter cited as Toole, "Montana:
A Twentieth Century Portrait.”
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The ease with which small town banks could obtain a 
charter, particularly the state banks, presupposes that 
there were never tight controls placed on the chartering 
of banks. Montana did have banking regulations at that 
time but statewide supervision proved very weak. Any per­
son or group of bank promoters had only to put up the 
necessary collateral to purchase a charter. No experience 
in banking was required for the bank’s officers or dir­
ectors .
Since there were few experienced bankers in the state, 
local businessmen and farmers answered the call to fill 
the needed positions. Worse, bankers who were brought to 
Montana to manage these banks knew little of the state’s 
dependence on a narrow agricultural economy. Although 
these men knew the ins and outs of banking they knew nothing 
about wheat farming and its unpredictable elements.
Before the drought came in 19-17, hopes of making quick 
profits encouraged the extension of many loans. Bankers 
charged the farmer from 10 to 12 percent interest and rare­
ly checked his collateral. There is the story of a Montana 
farmer who had borrowed $10,000 from a banker in Choteau 
county. A neighbor commented that he did not think he 
could sleep at night if it were he who had taken such a 
high loan. "Why should I be troubled,” the borrower ex­
claimed } ’’the banker should be the one to worry, its his 
money.” 2 7
^Personal interview with Harold M. Brown, Choteau 
county homesteader and school teacher, Great Falls, Montana,
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Not only were local bankers careless about making 
their loans, but this incident illustrated the irrespon­
sibility of many borrowers. The average Montana farmer 
paid on his loan only after he had sold his crop, figured 
his living expenses for the coining year, and bought addi­
tional farm equipment— oftentimes a new car. "Usually 
the loan was renewed, and frequently the accrued interest 
was added to _/his;7 debt; in fact, by that time most bankers
had been carrying the loans so long that they had to try
28to keep their borrowers solvent or go down with them."
The total deposits for all of Montana’s banks in
1921 was only $2,000,000 more than their total assets.
The ratio of loans to deposits was an incredibly high 98.6
2 Q *percent.'67 In many banks it was not unusual to find loans 
exceeding deposits, some by outrageously high amounts. In
1922 the First State Bank of Buffalo had $71,000 in deposits 
and $145,000 in loans; the Virgelle State Bank, $24*000 in 
deposits and $41,000 in loans; and the Citizens State Bank 
of Clyde Park, $55,000 in deposits and $199,000 in loans.
December 20, 1970. Hereafter cited as interview, Harold 
M . Brown.
^Groth, "Montana Banking, 1910-1925,” 32.
29Heiber and Van Nice, paper presented before Federal 
Reserve Bank members, Oct. 15, 1966.
The latter had a loan to deposit ratio of 360 percent.3^
The bank failed a year later in 1923*
"National banks were at a competitive disadvantage
with state banks until /the passage of/ the Federal Reserve
Act of 1913* but thereafter they entered the field with an
aggressiveness unbecoming their self-asserted conserva- 
31tism." . Reductions on reserve requirements and privileges 
of extending real estate loans opened the profitable savings 
business to national banks. Loans could be extended on 
improved farm land, providing they did not exceed one-half 
of the properties market v a l u e . 32 There was a maximum 
limit of five years on these loans.
Competition between state and national banks became 
very pronounced, not only for obtaining depositors, but 
for loaning money. Unfortunately, though, the bankers 
proved to be better lenders than promotion experts in 
attracting depositors. This is borne out by the fact that 
the Helena Branch of the Ninth Federal Reserve District in 
February, 1921, (the day it opened) secured $4,775*000 in 
deposits from its member banks and $7*665*000 in loans.
31Toole, "Montana: A Twentieth Century Portrait," 54*
32Donald Jerome Elliott, "Commercial Bank Failures 
in Montana* 1920-1926" (unpublished MA thesis, Archives* 
University of Montana, 1967)* 14. Hereafter cited as
Elliott, "Commercial Bank Failures, 1920-1926."
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In only six months loans climbed to $13y601,Q00--three 
times the amount of its member bank deposits.^
To compound matters these small banks became caught 
in the same dilemma which faced many of the nation’s 
other rural banks— the inability to diversify their loans. 
Dependent on one-crop industries, the country banks limit­
ed their sphere of operation. By not spreading their 
loans beyond the reach of a single local economy they 
could never hope to hold their own in a time of adversity.
In times of prosperity in these sections, banks were 
prosperous, in times of adversity banks failed.^
America’s banking systems in agricultural regions 
had never been sound in the past, due to their dependence 
on one-crop communities in which they were located. This 
proved to be the common denominator for the majority of 
the banks in Montana. In addition to one-crop dependence, 
Montana banks had several other ’’...distinct characteristics 
in common: more state banks failed than national; more
small banks failed than large; more country banks failed 
than city banks; more new banks failed than old; and more 
failed east of the Continental Divide than west.1' ^
33Heiber and Van Nice, paper presented before Federal 
Reserve Bank members, Oct. 15, 1966.
^Charles Wallace Collins. Rural Banking Reform (New 
York: The MacMillan Co., 1931), 67-8. Hereafter cited
as Collins, Rural Banking Reform.
3 5Toole, ’’Montana: A Twentieth Century Portrait,” 54.
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The summer of 1917 brought 1 .it tie moisture. This first
year of drought ushered .in the lean years ol‘ 19.1 8, 1919
and 1920. The summers were long and the parched lands of
eastern Montana furnished no pasture for the vast sheep
and cattle herds. Wheat harvests dwindled and the ground
lay scorched in the glaring sunlight. Deflation ensued
in 1919 and cattle that were worth $100 the fall before
were sold from $25 to $50 a head.3^ Wheat was $3*30 a
17bushel that year and sold for $.92 in 1922.
The surge in European agriculture during this time 
drove the price of wheat even lower in some states. In 
1921 the United States exported $551*000,000 of wheat, 
by 1929 only $192,000,000, a decline of 65 percent.3  ̂ No 
longer could the western wheat farmer look to foreign 
markets to sustain his prosperity. Newspapers in report­
ing agricultural prices in July 1919 announced a seemingly 
unrelated fact that living costs had risen in the United
States by 88 percent since 1913---further burdens awaited
3 9Montana T s honyockers.
■^^Superintendent of Banks, Annual Report of the 
Banking Department. State of Montana for the fiscal year 
ending June 30, 1924 (Helena, Mont.: Independent Publish­
ing Co., 1924). Hereafter cited as Annual Bank Report 
(with given year).
3^Toole* "Montana Agriculture, 1917-1925,” 4»
^McCracken, The Northwest in Two Wars, 12-3•
3^Toole, "Montana Agriculture, 1917-1925*” 5.
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III
The sudden closing of a bank’s doors is a shock to 
the whole community, L, Q. Skelton, the state Superintend­
ent of Banks, in 1924* in his annual report for the end of 
that fiscal year vividly described the effect of a bank’s 
termination:
The ruin, the distress, the litigation, bankruptcies, 
the wrath of the depositors, a suicide or two, homes 
broken up, fortunes lost, labor’s savings swept away, 
the widow’s mite gone, business stagnated, confidence 
shaken, men of reputation sent to prison perhaps, 
and all that follows the order to close the doors of 
a bank, are circumstances of the first magnitude, 
and hence no thoughtful Superintendent can but feel 
the importance and responsibility of his office and 
the dreadful consequences of a false step.4^
Local depositors were the worst hurt. Money was diffi­
cult to accumulate in rural communities, especially through 
years of self-denial and careful planning for one’s final 
days of leisure. . Banking policies were not easily under­
stood, The sudden closing of a bank’s doors and its place­
ment in the hands of an unfamiliar adjustor caused a loss 
of confidence. To small merchants it often meant bank­
ruptcy and ruin. To individual depositors it brought de­
spair and bewilderment— Montana was a paradigm of all this 
in the 1920’s.
^°Annual Bank Report, June 30, 1924*
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Equally affected were those who borrowed from the bank. 
To meet the demands of the depositors every asset was li­
quidated, the majority of which consisted of the notes of 
the borrowers. The immediate closing of a bank for receiver­
ship purposes or for liquidation necessitated the collec­
tion of all outstanding notes, usually held by local mer­
chants and farmers. From 1919 to 1929 the bankruptcy 
rate of Montana's farms was the highest in the nation.
Farm mortgage indebtedness reached an unbelievably high 
figure of $175,000,000.41
The stockholders of community banks bought shares 
for the purpose of■investment— usually these shareholders 
were local farmers and businessmen. When a bank failed 
these stockholders were responsible for any loss to the 
depositors. Many Montana farmers and merchants who were 
fortunate to survive the disaster of the falling wheat 
market found themselves ruined because they owned stock 
in local banks.
Another class that assumed responsibility for bank 
failures was the directors. Boards of directors of banks 
possessed a personal liability for the actual operations 
of the bank. Although operated by a president and his 
staff, the bank*s directors were liable for any negligence 
of mismanagement. Bank presidents, their vice presidents 
and cashiers, after a bank*s failure, were generally
44Howard, Montana: High..Wide, and Handsome, 208.
the targets ef an impaired reputation since they had not 
only a financial responsibility, but a mqral obligation to 
t he community.
One incident, for example, that questioned the integ­
rity of one of these local bankers occurred in 1924, in a 
Fort Benton bank. A middle-aged widow with six children 
inquired if it would be safe to deposit her $300 savings 
in the bank. The banker replied, pointing out the window 
at the Missouri River, ”Lady, when the water in that river 
starts to flow in the opposite direction, then you can be­
gin to worry about the safety of your money in this bank.n^^ 
Two weeks after she deposited her money the bank failed, 
no doubt little surprise to the banker who knew the finan­
cial condition of his own bank prior to its failing.
Montana’s bank failures produced an epidemic loss of 
faith and launched a run op the state’s commercial banks. 
Farmers openly voiced their disenchantment and local poli­
ticians and newspapers took up the cry. Someone was to 
blame and the role of scapegoat fell to the Federal Reserve 
System.
42Interview, Harold M. Brown. Joseph Kinsey Howard 
took the opposite stance in supporting his attack oh the 
Federal Reserve System as the major reason for Montana’s 
bank failures. He maintained that dishonesty did not 
break one of the banks which closed in Montana during the 
1920’s, Several bankers and employees did go to jail, 
he contended, but in nearly every instance the offense 
was falsification of the books in a desperate attempt to 
keep their banks alive, and with no effort to profit per­
sonally. Howard, Montanai High, Wide, and Handsome. .233*
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Joseph Kinsey Howard sujnmed up the feeling of many 
Montanans in regard to that agency. He insisted that 
"...the Federal Reserve Board deliberately smashed prices 
while relentlessly squeezing agricultural paper out of 
rural banks leaving them with inadequate economic resources 
for the community." Further, "...unnecessary deflation 
policies removed money from Montana and placed it in 
Federal Reserve vaults while the life flowed out of the 
state." The final straw occurred when the Liberty Bonds,, 
which were the last assets of the rural bankers and their 
customers, reached discounts of $.80 on the dollar. The 
end result for Montana’s farmers was "...distress selling 
of wheat and livestock to meet overdue notes.
This opinion has been widely accepted throughout the 
state, no doubt due to the popularity of Howard’s book. 
Someone must accept the responsibility for the state’s 
"banking disaster" in the 1920’s and Montanans willingly 
approved the book’s convincing arguments. "It was easier 
to deal with a conspiracy by men than the cycles of nature 
and complex world economic conditions«"44
Howard’s theories, however, are now being questioned 
by Federal Reserve officials and western historians. Since 
the Federal Reserve System began in 1913 ib seems improbable
^Howard, Montana: High, Wide, and Handsome. See
chapter twenty, "The Role of the Federal Reserve."
44 Toole, "Montana: A Twentieth Century Portrait," 57.
28
that it was experienced enough to prevent the downfall of 
the western economy. The Board had no control over the 
drop in wheat prices and the resulting loss of faith. Nor, 
did the agency have the ability to control the balances 
of member banks to any important degree. Even had it 
possessed such power, it would not follow that the Board 
was responsible for either the magnitude of member bank 
balances or the use to which they were p u t . ^
The Ninth Federal District and the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Minneapolis were no exception. The Federal Reserve 
had only limited authority over Ninth District banks. This 
is demonstrated by the fact that seventy percent of Montana’s 
banks failed in the years 1921-1929. The same percentage 
failed in South Dakota, while North Dakota lost sixty- 
two percent and Minnesota thirty-one percent,^ This was 
the highest rate of bank failures of any district in the 
nation. The national average was only twenty percent, 
lending suspicion to local bank practices in the Ninth 
District.
When questioning the policy of the Ninth District, 
the Minneapolis Bank did all it could to prevent the run 
on its member banks— particularly those in Montana. In
45S. E. H a m s ,  Twenty Years of Federal Reserve Policy 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1933)> 228.
4UExcerpt from 1953 Annual Report. Federal Reserve 
Bank of Minneapolis, Archives, University of Montana.
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addition to the $13*601,000 the Minneapolis Bank loaned to 
Montana banks, "...so much credit was extended that th<s 
bank’s gold reserves would have fallen below the legal 
minimum if it had not borrowed from other Federal Reserve 
b a n k s . I n  1920 approximately 89 percent of all the out­
standing loans of the Minneapolis Bank (nearly $90,000,000) 
were extensions to agricultural and livestock interests in 
the Ninth Federal Reserve District.
Joseph Kinsey Howard was correct, though, when he said 
the Federal Reserve forced hardships on many western farm­
ers. The board tightened credit too hard and too fast to 
curb ’’inflationary borrowing.’’ It was also to blame for en­
couraging increased post-war wheat production and for being 
unsympathetic toward the mass exodus of ruined honyockers. 
’’Increased wheat planting held serious consequences for 
farmers who incurred large mortgage obligations on the 
basis of high war prices. They soon realized the mistake 
of carrying this indebtedness and making payments when 
prices dropped.”49
But, it cannot be held responsible for indiscriminate 
chartering and inflated farm values. The chartering of 
state banks was not the responsibility of the Federal Reserve
47Ibid.
“̂ Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, The Federal 
Reserve Bank and the Farmer Stockman (Minneapolis: Federal
Reserve Bank, April 2, 192l), 9. Copy in the Archives,
University of Montana.
. A. Goldenweiser, American Monetary Policy (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1951), 137.
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System. They were chartered by the state of Montana and 
the Comptroller of the Currency.^ Neither could the 
Federal Reserve accept responsibility when the banks be­
came over-extended. Easy credit policies were not the 
answer, for further loans only encouraged banks to make 
further extensions of credit.
’’The great number of failures of small country banks 
had no direct relationship to the Federal Reserve System.”'*'*' 
The same case can be made for the Ninth Federal Reserve 
District. The causes for these banking failures must be 
found elsewhere.
No one major cause can be attributed to the high mor­
tality of Montana banks and the failures of its farmers. 
Rather it was a combination of many reasons that weighed 
so heavily on Montana’s economy that a collapse was in­
evitable .
Drought, poor crops, inexperienced homesteaders, in­
flated land values, county splitting, declining wheat and 
beef prices, and the loss of European markets all placed 
a strain on Montanafs banks. Promiscuous chartering, mis­
management, inexperience in banking, lack of diversification 
of loans, over-extension of credit, and unwise Federal 
Reserve policies compounded these matters. The end result 
was a loss of confidence for the local farmers, culminated 
by a run on the state’s unstable banks and a mass exodus
CQLetter, Clement Van Nice to John H. Toole, Dec0 8, 
1966 Archives, University of Montana.
51Collins, Rural Banking Reform. 42.
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of Montana’s homesteaders.
CHAPTER II
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
FACTORS OF THE BANK
I
On February 15, 1910, the Gilman State Bank offi­
cially became an incorporated bank in Montana. Origin­
ally known as the Augusta State Bank, it began operation 
in Augusta, Montana, 53 miles west of Great Falls and 
25 miles south of Choteau at the foot of the Rocky 
Mountains.. The idea of starting the bank originated in 
Cando, North Dakota; six men signed the articles of in­
corporation .
Augusta at that time was badly in need of a bank be­
cause merchandise had to be brought by freight team and 
mail had to be transported overland by stage.-*- A bank 
in this region, these men reasoned, would serve a useful 
purpose. If managed properly, Augusta had the capacity 
to support a local bank.
The principal coordinator, and only president of the 
bank, was Abraham Lincoln Bradley. Born of English parents 
and reared in Ontario, Canada, Bradley began his career 
at the age of seventeen. After graduating from high school 
in 1882, in Bowmanville, Ontario, he assumed the position
Tape recording, Homer J. Wellman to the author 
April 15, 1971* Hereafter cited as tape, Homer J. Wellman.
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of messenger boy in the Merchants Bank of St. Thomas, 
Ontario. He remained in that capacity for two and one- 
half years until he started a homestead near Langdon,
North Dakota.
Bradley's homesteading days lasted ten years, until 
1894, when he accepted the post as bookkeeper in a Langdon 
implement firm. In 1900, after a six year stint in Langdon, 
he moved to Cando and worked as a bookkeeper for another 
implement company, Currie and Riggs. He stayed there un­
til 1910, when he assumed the presidency of the Augusta 
State Bank.2
Another charter member of the bank was R. Percy 
Abbey. A native of Grand Forks, North Dakota, he gradu­
ated in 1904 from the University of North Dakota. He 
studied law for a year and eventually obtained employment 
in Cando as chief clerk and cashier for a local realty 
company.^ He also handled duties as bookkeeper and ab­
stractor, and managed many of the firm's farm loans. It 
was in Cando that Abbey and Bradley met and formed their 
lasting friendship. From the bank's origin to January,
1917, Percy Abbey served as cashier.
OLetter, R. Percy Abbey to the Bradstreet Company,May 10, 1910, Gilman State Bank papers, Archives, Univer­
sity of Montana. Hereafter cited as Gilman papers.
^Letter, Abbey to Thomas H. Carter, Oct. 31* 1910, 
Gilman papers.
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Other men instrumental in the bank’s formation and 
signers of the articles of incorporation included: Harry
Lord, cousin to Abbey and cashier of the First State Bank 
of Candoj J. S. Conyers, a local Cando rancher; J. C. Furman, 
Augusta resident and hotel owner; and M. A. Wellman, owner 
and operator of an Augusta mercantile firm.
These men bought 200 of the original 2 50 shares in 
the bank. Each share sold for $100.^ This left only 
$5,000 to sell to meet the original $25,000 goal for the 
bank’s capital stock. Augusta area residents bought some 
of the shares and the remainder went to interested par­
ties in North Dakota, Iowa, Minnesota and Illinois.
The Augusta State Bank began its operation in the 
center of the Sun River Valley. The bank did a respectable 
business in Augusta and speculation ensued over building a
4 t a b l e i
SHARES OF STOCK CONTROLLED 
BY THE ORIGINAL DIRECTORS 
OF THE AUGUSTA STATE BANK
Name Shares Amount
J. S. Conyers 
A. L. Bradley 
R. Percy Abbey 
J. C. Furman 
M. A. Wellman
Harry Lord 50
50
40
40
10
10
$5,000
$5,000
$4,000
$4,000
$1,000
$1,000
The Articles of Incorporation, Feb. 15, 1910, Gil­
man papers.
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permanent structure, as the bank had only temporary quar­
ters. At that time Augusta had a population of 400, 
served by a variety of stores.
The local paper, in a short historical sketch about 
the community that appeared weekly, described the assets 
and opportunities abounding in Augusta. In addition to 
its four churches and excellent school, the article stated 
that the community maintained ’’...three general stores, 
three saloons, two good hotels, two barber shops, a pool 
and billiard hall, ad opera house, a moving picture show, 
a clothes cleaning shop and a first class creamery.
The small town also had the usual lumber yard, drug store, 
livery stable, blacksmith shop, garage, implement dealer 
and real estate company.
The Great Northern received a great deal of freight
out of the Augusta area in the way of cattle, sheep,' and
wool. Ranchers shipped few farm products as most of it
was used on the ranches. Other railroads, such as the
Milwaukee, got this freight after it reached Great Falls,
so the Great Northern board of directors was anxious to
f\tap this area with a spur line.
The railroad undertook a survey to determine the 
main line through the Sun River Canyon. The railroad an­
nounced that it intended to continue the line through the 
canyon, ’’...over the continental divide and down the Middle
^Appeareb weekly in the Augusta Times. 
^Tape, Homer J, Wellman.
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Fork of the Flathead River to join with the main track 
in the vicinity of Nimrod on the southern boundary of 
Glacier P a r k . ” ? When the railroad completed the survey, 
Augusta was off the planned route; one reason being that 
the area had poor drainage.
At a point two miles northeast of Augusta on the 
proposed route the railroad bought approximately 160 
acres of land from a longtime area rancher, E. D. Boone. 
Here it established a new town, Gilman— named after one 
of the Great Northern officials. The Gilman Townsite 
Company formed as a corporation and "...was known as be­
ing owned by the Great Northern. Bradley, however, was 
one that was very active with the front men in selling 
lots.”8
Bradley and several other Augusta residents saw the 
opportunity of moving to this new location. They had the 
idea they could move most of the businesses to Gilman.
By moving general stores, hotels, livery stables and 
saloons, Bradley and the others felt that a ghost town
Qwould be left behind.7
In March 1912, Percy Abbey wrote a friend that, 
"...we are selling lots in the town of Gilman and have
^Great Falls Tribune. Jan. 7* 1938• 
8Tape, Homer J. Wellman.
9Ibid .
sold quite a number. Augusta people have taken lots 
_/and there are7 in the neighborhood of 70 lots gone al­
ready. Five months later in correspondence with a 
stockholder, Abbey wrote: "The townsite company has of­
fered us two lots, free on the best corner in town if we 
will erect a brick or stone building." He further expressed 
hope in the move: "I think we can greatly increase our
business when we have a building that looks like a bank.
It will more than make interest on the investment and we
11are getting a valuable corner thrown in."
Most of Montana’s banks at that time had buildings 
of either brick or stone. The bank in Gilman, constructed 
of red brick, was no exception. This construction not 
only limited the chance of fire and burglary, but denoted 
strength and stability in the institution. Depositors 
felt more secure with their money in an imposing structure, 
not to mention the prosperity it represented in the com­
munity .
The townsite also gave lots to prospective residents 
and businessmen to entice them to abandon their ties with 
Augusta and re-establish themselves in Gilman. "The old 
guard in Augusta was quite a stubborn group and they werel
Letter, Abbey to Orie T. Brown, March 2, 1912, 
Gilman papers.
■^Letter, Abbey to F. W. Ramaley, Aug. 27, 1912, 
Gilman papers.
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not in agreement with Bradley moving the bank.”'1"2
One of these men was J. C. Furman, an original stock­
holder in the firm, On September 12, 1912, the bank 
called a special stockholder's meeting to discuss removal 
to Gilman. Bradley, who controlled 90 votes (50 of his 
own and 40 by proxy), voted in favor of moving the bank 
and changing the name to the Gilman State Bank. Percy 
Abbey, with 80 shajres (40 by proxy), also favored the 
motion. J. C. Furman, who had 10 individual shares and 
controlled the pro^y on 40 more, opposed the move. After 
the motion passed, the directors decided to keep pace
with the foreseen prosperity by voting to increase the
1 onumber of directors from five to eight.
Furman immediately resigned as one of the bank’s 
directors before it relocated in Gilman, later to serve 
as a director for a new bank in Augusta. Other residents 
in the area also chose sides and two camps developed -—  
those supporting the established city of Augusta, and 
those who backed Bradley and the formation of Gilman.
Disenchanted with the move the bank’s vice president, 
A. W. Beach, "...offered his stock for sale and withdrew 
active support of the institution" as reported in the
'*'2Tape, Homer J. Wellman.
11JMinutes of the stockholder’s meeting, Sept, 12, 
1912, Gilman papers. Hereafter cited as minutes (with 
given year).
39
minutes. The stockholders elected E. D. Boone to fill 
the new vacancy.^4
An intense rivalry developed between the two commu­
nities to take the other off the map. Gilman's residents 
based their hopes on the populace moving from Augusta to 
their town; Augusta's citizens relied on the belief that 
the railroad would be extended the additional two miles 
to their city. The Great Falls Tribune, some years later 
in describing the rivalry, commented: "Not only were the
townspeople arrayed against each other, but families were 
split by divided loyalties."^
Habitual conflict over the railroad, coupled with 
the removal of the bank to Gilman, pushed ill-feeling to 
feverish heights. This, added to Bradley's attempts to 
garner support from Augusta firms, precipitated a move 
in Augusta that dealt heavily on the Gilman State Bank. 
Bradley had alienated so many Augusta residents that a 
group organized to start another bank--this one in Au­
gusta. The action immediately cut in half the bank's 
potential monetary resources in the area. The new bank, 
the Peoples Bank of Augusta, received its charter on 
December 22, 1912. This occurred less than one month 
after the Gilman bank had relocated.
■^Minutes, Nov. 12, 1912, Gilman papers. 
~^Great Falls Tribune. Jan. 7f 1938*
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The rivalry reached such a high point that by the 
fall of 19l3> Gilman residents clamored for their own 
school district, the construction of a school, and the 
hiring of a teacher. Several citizens circulated a peti­
tion for the employment of a teacher and the expense of 
running a school for four months. These people collected
$270 of the $300 pledged; only four of the twenty-four who
X 6pledged their support did not pay.
An article in the Helena Daily Independent reported
the school dispute: ’’Apparently the Augusta people want
to control the Gilman school, which is decidedly un-Ameri- 
X7can.” ' The county commissioner and chairman of the board 
of school trustees .in the Augusta district, C. C. Coving­
ton (who resided in Augusta) refused to allow the move.
A Gilman resident, C. W. Burns, ’’...appeared in the of­
fice of the county commissioners one day with a new peti­
tion asking that the district be created.” He stated:
”1 do not represent the Gilman Commercial club nor do I 
represent Mr. Bradley and the Gilman State Bank, but I
Undated petition sent to the school trustees for 
the establishment of a school, Gilman School District 
No. 31 papers, Archives, University of Montana. Hereafter 
cited as Gilman school papers.
17Helena Daily Independent, date unknown, clipping 
in Gilman school papers file.
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do represent the people of this district."^
In describing the issue the Helena paper remarked:
There was a persistent rumor from the Gilman neigh­
borhood to the effect that Burns forgot to in­
clude one other institution among those whom he 
represented— namely C. C. Covington. At any rate 
Mr. Covington suffered a complete change of heart 
almost instantly and before Burns had left for 
his Gilman home that afternoon Mr. Covington and 
the remaining members of the board readily and 
graciously agreed to give Gilman the school dis­
trict ,19
Six months later, in April 1914, Gilman held elections 
for school trustees and C. W. Burns ran for one of the 
three posts. At that time there was no official ballot 
and the candidates had to print their own. The other 
three candidates all had their names on the same ballot;
E. D. Boone, the vice president of the Gilman bank, being 
one of them..
In reporting the election the Helena Daily Independent 
stated: "All the candidates but Burns had their own ballots
printed, but one of Cpvington1s political wheels apparent­
ly missed a revolution, for this important piece of politi­
cal strategy was overlooked by him and his candidate."
By forgetting to have his ballots printed Burns lost the 
election. This probably had only a limited effect on 
the election for he had very little support. The news-
■^Helena Daily Independent, April 12, 1914•
paper article continued: "That the people of Gilman did
not want Burns in the office of school trustee is shown 
in the decisive manner he was beaten. Out of the total 
of 100 votes cast, Philip Mayer received 96; E. D. Boone 
94; F. M. Mack 64, and C. W. Burns 35.”2°
Dissatisfied over Burn's defeat Covington stated that 
the election was illegal and it was not the will of the 
majority. Again the Helena paper replied: "The will of
the majority in this instance meant the will of Covington 
who has been attempting to boss the political fortunes 
of the northern part of /Lewis and Clark/ county for sev­
eral years." Concluding, the story noted: "Although Mr.
Covington is a resident of Augusta, he was in Gilman dur­
ing the entire day of the election gum-shoeing for votes
21for his own candidate."
The problem of creating the new school district in 
Gilman and the subsequent issues over the election dealt 
a final blow to Bradley's aspirations for his bank, and 
more importantly his town. After that any supporters he 
had left in Augusta deserted him in favor of the newly 
formed Peoples Bank. This maneuver proved without a 
doubt Bradley's intentions of making Gilman completely
o 0Ibid. In this election the electorate voted for 
three of the four candidates.
2lIbid.
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independent of Augusta, at the latter*s expense. Others, 
more skeptical, felt such action only augmented Birad ley *s 
true intent in trying to eliminate Augusta.
A. L. Bradley was like many of the bankers in Montana 
during this time. These men were in such positions of 
influence that they naturally became the leaders in the 
community. They had to know a little about everybody, and 
a lot about everything that influenced the town. Since 
they depended on the town's economy and the local resi­
dents it proved necessary to be well informed„ These 
men frequently ran for local offices, especially those 
that maintained the schools. E. D. Boone's election as 
a school trustee pleased Bradley and ensured still further 
control of Gilman.
Bradley through his leadership in the community, 
as banker and chief public relations man, attempted to 
gather support from all areas. In a letter sent to a 
man inquiring about the town, he replied: "We believe
that Gilman will make a 'cracking good town* and it will 
pay you to investigate the same when you come to Mont­
ana.”22
Further writings in the local papers greatly in­
tensified the split between the towns. The flamboyant 
journalism employed by the two editors in no way helped
22Letter, Bradley to 0. C. Lauch, March 16, 1912, 
Gilman papers.
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Bradley heal the wounds and regain financial support from 
Augusta businesses and residents. Editorials in the 
Augusta Times and the Gilman Optimist underscored the 
sentiment of the two towns. Leo J. Simpson of the Gil­
man paper and Will J. Randall of the Augusta Times car­
ried on tirades in their weekly papers predicting the 
immediate ruin of the other’s township.
Randall frequently referred to Bradley as ’’Old Long
2 oiNose sitting in a gilded cage pulling the strings.”
Local residents applauded his bombastic editorials and 
his staunch supporters refused to move. Simpson retorted 
that the people in Augusta should quit worrying and re­
sign themselves to Augusta’s fate as a ’’vanishing entity.” 
He ranted that they would never get the railroad and Gil­
man would succeed as the leading community in the Sun 
River region.
In November 1914/ Randall blasted Simpson in one of 
his true-to-form editorials. ’’Were it not for the in­
sistence of the Optimist in4 saying we will not get the 
railroad, we would not pay any attention to it. We know 
positively that we will get the railroad and we know just 
how we are going to do it.”2^
2 'ITape, Homer J. Wellman.
2^Augusta Times. Nov. 20, 1914.
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A year later in response to an action by Simpson
the Times observed:
After more than 2 years of fruitless effort to 
get a strangle hold on Augusta and silence her 
forever, he /Simpson/ has hit upon an effective 
plan and by a simple twist of the wrist-presto- 
change-Augusta vanishes in the ethereal blue and 
does not even make a blot on the snow covered 
landscape.
It was all done so quietly. No noise, no confu­
sion, no blood curdling scenes or shrieks of ang­
uish. The operation was painless. Just one 
stroke of a penknife and Augusta disappeared off 
that map forever.
The first knowledge of our misfortune was obtained 
from the Gilman Optimist of last week. It con­
tained a map of the Sun River Valley oil field and 
when we looked for Augusta, the map did not show 
that there was such a place. The editor of the 
Optimist had quietly eraced /sic/ 'it. ^
The movement of the Augusta bank to Gilman, the subse­
quent formation of the Peoples Bank, the early rivalry for 
the railroad, and the division of the school districts did 
not help Bradley1s attempts to establish rapport with 
Augusta’s citizens. Lines that had separated the towns 
became more clearly drawn in the ensuing years. The strug­
gle between the banks continued; neither one prospering.
Since the larger ranchers in the area had their banking 
connections either in Helena or Great Falls, the two coun­
try banks ” ...had to rely on the small businesses and pick 
up the crumbs here and there as they could find them.”^
2^Augusta Times. Jan. 14, 1916. 
26Tape, Homer J. Wellman.
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The newly formed Peoples Bank of Augusta loaned most­
ly to small ranchers and Augusta merchants. The bank in 
Gilman had two strikes against itself after the Augusta 
bank started operating. First of all, the bank "...took
all of the slow loans out of the Augusta area when it moved 
2 7to Gilman.” The more prominent businessmen and citizens 
could not condone Bradley*s actions and withdrew support of 
his bank when it relocated. Secondly, ”...the Gilman bank 
loaned almost exclusively on the properties known as the 
bench^S the homesteaders, who in turn had no experience 
in farming and very little chance of making good, except
o Qin some bumper years, which did not happen. y
By splitting the business in the upper Sun River 
Valley, the two banks "...had no more chance of making 
money than some of the homesteaders out on the bench."^
For example, if the bank had $150,000 worth of loans 
and got 12 per cent interest (one percent a month), that 
was only $1,500 a month income. In addition, the bank 
borrowed from the customers in the way of time certificates 
of deposit and had to pay six percent interest. This
^7lbid.
r y Q The name bench referred to the benchland areas north 
of Gilman. Land of this nature was generally on rolling 
pleateau regions above river valleys and canyons.
29Tape, Homer J, Wellman.
3°Ibid.
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expense, plus the salaries of the bank employees, and the 
cost of doing business--the overhead of the building, 
utilities, taxes, interest, insurance, etc.— left a very 
thin margin for doing business.^
After the bank moved to Gilman the election of new 
officers and directors took place. Bradley remained as 
president, Boone as vice president, and Abbey as cashier. 
Directors included: M. M. Connor, Alex Chisholm (later a
director of the Augusta bank), Oliver Bernier, G. B. 
Christian, Harry Lord, and the three bank’s officers.
II
Gilman, located in the heart of the Sun River Valley, 
was a community of about 250 people in 1913. Speculation 
had it at one time that the town might reach several thou­
sand . It had the usual lumber yards, general stores,
3 In December, 1920 the Gilman bank president received 
$225 salary per month, the cashier received $190, and the 
assistant cashier $175— this totaled $590. In addition 
the monthly average for expenses that year was $1,170; ad­
ded to salaries this brought the total to $1,760. Loans 
in December 1920 reached $204,000. Average monthly interest 
(figured on a 12 percent yearly basis) was $2,040. That 
left just about $280 with which to transact business— very 
definitely a thin margin. Report of the Condition of the 
Gilman State Bank. Dec. 29, 1920, Gilman papers. Here­
after cited as Gilman Condition Report (with given year) .
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jewelry shop, meat market, elevator, stock yards, hotels 
and s a l o o n s . 8^ The completion of the railroad in Decem­
ber 1912 opened the way for the development of the area 
under the Sun River Irrigation Project. The intent of 
such a project was to open the Sun River Valley region to 
irrigated farm land, in addition to controlling spring 
run-off.
The entire Sun River project made up five separate 
units ranging from the foot of the Rocky Mountains east­
ward to Great Falls. These units included: Greenfield,
Sun River Slope, Big Coulee, Mill Coulee, and Fort Shaw.
It comprised portions of three different counties— the 
southeastern part of Teton county, northwestern Cascade, 
and northern Lewis and Clark county.
Before the advent of this project the Sun River region 
depended heavily on stock raising as its principal commo­
dity. The buffalo, like the cattle herds, found an abun­
dance of good grass. The Blackfeet abounded here due to 
a storehouse of meat and other edible forage. The white 
man’s westward movement pushed the Indians off this land 
and by the lS80fs they had been placed on reservations.
The white settlers found hunting and trapping facili­
ties very enticing and remained to locate in the area. The 
Sun River provided a bountiful water supply ideal for
3 2Letter, Abbey to Ramaley, Aug. 27, 1912, Gilman papers.
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settlement. One writer quite aptly described the Sun River:
The little stream which, like a silvery ribbon 
joins the metropolis of Montana to the pleasures 
of the mountains, was well named when called the 
river of the Sun. Flowing almost directly east 
and west, both the morning and evening sun reflect 
in this stream.33
Stockmen drove their herds from western Montana and
Idaho into the Sun River Valley soon after the construction
of the Fort Shaw Military Post. Completed in 1869, the
fort prevented "...marauding Indian parties from driving off
live'stock.’*34 Many ranchers located in the foothills and
stream valleys that fed the Sun River. "The land taken up
by the early stockmen was chiefly bottom lands suitable for
pasture and for the production of wild hay, winter grazing
lands, and land on which water holes were located."35
An editorial in the Great Falls Tribune in 1905, in
anticipation of the Sun River project stated:
Nothing in the history of this part of the country 
has been undertaken that means so much for Great 
Falls as the irrigation of the Sun River lands, 
both north and south of the river. The comple­
tion of this work alone will mean at least 25,000 
additional people in this city.39
33Great Falls Tribune. May 1, 1932.
^Montana Experiment Station, Soils of Lewis and Clark 
County. Bulletin 445 (Bozeman: Montana State College, 1947),
20 .
35Ibid., 21.
36Great Falls Tribune. Sept. 2 4, 1905. See the popula­
tion statistics of Great Falls on page 9, footnote 10.
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In another editorial that same year the project
gained rhetorical acclaim:
Out of the deep canyon fortresses of the main 
chain of the Rockies, where gray granite and 
white limestone pierce the clouds, flowing east-r 
ward from the continental divide, pours down the 
Sun river, a crystal, icy, rushing torrent, leap­
ing over precipitate heights and surging through 
narrow and impassable gorges.
Would man bridle and tame such an untamed bron­
cho of the wild western country, running its 
fierce, unchecked course, and make it do plebian 
duty on the agricultural plains and valleys be-
-I - f-.__.l_ _• j_l_ _■ ^  O  a c r e g  Q f  f e T -
The whole Sun River Project was in its infancy in 
1913 when Gilman began to establish itself as a potential 
economic center of the valley. The Reclamation Service at
of the Sun River (20 miles northwest of Gilman), and con­
structing 54 miles of main irrigation canal. This entailed 
a 1000 man payroll. In addition to being the headquarters 
for the Reclamation Service’s offices and supplies, Gilman
was at the terminus of the 20 mile road constructed to the
, 38dam site.
The majority of the workers spent their wages and 
leisure time in Gilman. Those that had a mind for thrifti­
ness deposited their money in the Gilman bank. "For the 
next ^several.71 years Gilman continued to grow with its popu­
tile desert loam Sun waters.37 touch of the
that time began building Diversion Dam on the North Fork
37Ibid., March 1, 1905.
3^Ibid., March 29, 1959.
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lation being estimated variously between 500 and 600. It 
became a center of the area. Farmers and ranchers gather­
ed here for fairs and rodeos and Fourth of July celebra-
O Qtions. Money flowed freely. Things looked good.”0
Mr. Bradleyfs "gilded cage” prospered.
Completion of Diversion Dam, and in later years Gibson 
Dam, changed the agricultural complexion of the region. 
Irrigation altered the range country from intensive stock 
raising to a mixture of grain crops and livestock. No 
longer did stock raising remain so predominant. By 1921,
C. W. Tewell, then cashier of the Gilman State Bank, wrote 
to a stockholder that ” ... about half of our territory is 
grain and the other half livestock.”
The rapid change of the region into a grain growing 
section necessitated the alteration of much of the stock 
grazing land. Local farmers borrowed from the bank to buy 
the necessary equipment. The Gilman State Bank and the
rival Peoples Bank of Augusta had to also alter their own
banking methods. The officers and directors knew very 
little about grain crops. Until that time the banks de­
pended almost entirely on the livestock in the area. They 
got along fine through the wet years, but when the dry 
years arrived it was not only the farmers that suffered, 
but also these two Ipanks.
^ Ibid.
^Letter, Tewell to Charles G. Reynolds, Aug. 10,
1921, Gilman papers.
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The majority of the depositors and borrowers that 
depended on the Gilman bank for their services had home­
steads on the Fairfield bench. This region covered sev­
eral hundred square miles northeast of Gilman extending 
from Spring Valley to the town of Fairfield, some 25 miles 
away. The bank did have patronizers that lived south of 
Augusta, but the bank in Augusta handled the majority of 
that business* Some of the farmers east of Gilman sup­
ported the bank, but most of them did their business in 
Simms and consequently did their banking in the same place. 
Located west of Gilman abopt 15 milqs were the Rocky 
Mountains. There was limited farming in this area due to 
the rocky slopes of the mountains; stock raising prpved to 
be most profitable and less strenuous than cultivation of 
grain crops*
A bulletin published by Montana State College in 1927 
thoroughly desribed the region around Gilman. "The soils 
of the Fairfield benph have been termed TFairfieldr ...and 
vary in texture. Rounded gravels are encountered just be­
low plow depth and may increase ip. number until a distinct 
gravelly loam layer is encountered.”41
North, of Gilman on the level land of the Sun River 
Slope the soil is termed, ”Pishkun.” ”In some cases the
^Montana Experiment Station, Soil Survey of the Sun River Irrigation Project. Bulletin 20 7 (Bozeman: Montana
State College, 1927), 10-5* Hereafter cited as Sun River 
Soil Survey, Bulletin 20 7.
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upper 2 or 3 inches of the surface soil contains but a 
small percentage of very fine gravels, but below this to 
a depth of 10 to 12 inches the gravel content is high 
and larger in diameter.11̂
The farmers east of Gilman planted their grains in 
"Simms silt loam" because this soil predominated in the 
vicinity of the town of Simms. This type of earth origin­
ates from recent stream deposits and is comparatively free 
of gravel particles. This soil has a tendency to become 
water-logged, but it is better than either Fairfield or 
Pishkun.43
None of these soils was conducive to dry land farming, 
and the gravel content in Fairfield and Pishkun types made 
irrigation almost hopeless, except for anything but stock 
r a i s i n g . 44 The tendency of Simms loam to become water­
logged when irrigated also altered standard farming pro­
cedures. The inexperienced homesteaders in this region 
knew little about soil content, let alone even some of the
42Ibid., 21.
43Ibid., 30.
44 ,See Mary Wilma M. Hargreaves, Dry Farming xn the
Northern Great Plains (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1957) • Thomas Shaw, Dry Farming (St. Paul: The
Pioneer Company 1911). John Witsoe, Dry Farming (New York: 
The MacMillan Company, 1920). Montana Experiment Station 
Dry Faming in Montana. Bulletin 63 (Bozeman: Montana State
College, 190 7)• Montana Experiment Station, Dry Farming in 
North Central Montana Triangle. Bulletin 66 (Bozeman: Mont­
ana State College, 1923 .
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basic considerations of grain farming. It is no wonder 
that these farmers could not get the yields that they 
had hoped. When times proved rough during the good years, 
failure and bankruptcy prevailed during the dry ones.
To make things even more difficult for the farmers, 
’’...the Sun River Project was within the region affected 
by chinooks. These warm winds were of benefit to stockmen 
in taking the snow off the range, but with the change to 
dry farming they occasioned a loss of moisture and laid the 
land bare and subject to blowing.”45
When the dry years began ” ...many homesteaders loaded 
all their goods on lumber-wagons and left their shacks to 
look for greener pasture; the little town of Gilman began 
feeling the bite of depression.’1̂  Rain that once fell 
from the sky in profusion was now as reliable as a slow 
train.
The 30 year rainfall average for the Sun River (11.0 9
inches)^ from 1888 to 1918 was not as high as that for
48the entire state (15.78) in an equivalent period. In 
fact, the least amount of rainfall desirable for dry land
4~*Sun River Soil Survey, Bulletin 207, 6-7•
^ Great Falls Tribune. March 29, 1959*
47 'Montana * s Resources. 1919, 38*
48The state average covered a 31 year period from 
1894 to 1925* Montana’s Resources. 1926, 17«
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farming was 15 inches.^ Four inches on the Sun River 
during the ” wet years’1 meant a lot of difference; during 
the arid years it was disastrous.
The Gilman bank depended on farmery that lived in 
three different counties— Lewis and Clark, Teton and
Cascade .50 In 1916, three of the six counties that re-
49Montana’s Resources. 1923, 37.
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Year
1916
1917
1918
1919
Y ear 
1916
1917
1918
1919
TABLE 2
PRECIPITATION IN MONTANA FROM 
1916-1919; MEASURED IN INCHES
State
17.90
13.64
13.85
15.77
Average
23.20
19.88
19.70
19.63
Lewis and Clark
18 .96 
15.50 
11.18 
12.77
Six Highest Counties
Teton
18.88
11.05
6.4317.08
Cascade
21.60
22.31
12.32 
15.14
Counties
(Hill, Gallatin, Cascade, Sanders, 
Beaverhead and Custer)
(Carbon, Lincoln, Sweet Grass. Pow­
ell, Cascade and Sanders) 
(Gallatin, Sanders, Stillwater, 
Beaverhead. Sweet Grass 
and Carbon)
(Beaverhead, Gallatin, Carbon, Fer­
gus, McCone and Lincoln)
56
ported the most precipitation were northern and central 
counties: Hill, 20.70 inches; Cascade, 21.6,0 inches, and
Sanders, 25.90 inches. The six lowest, with an overall 
average of 12.90 were all southern counties: Big Horn,
Wheatland, Meagher, Carter, Park and Jefferson.
Two years-later a complete reversal occurred. The 
counties reporting the least amount of moisture were alj 
northern and central counties: Teton, Blaine, Toole,
Chouteau> Phillips and Hil'l--the average was 8.71 inches. 
That same year only one porthepn county, Sanders, was 
among the top six that reported the most precipitation 
and it ranked fifth. Clearly the years of drought hit the 
northern counties first.
It was not until 1918 that the Gilman region felt the 
effect of the lean years. In an August letter of that 
year CJ. W. Tewell commented on the condition of the area: 
"It won't be a good yield because the early grain suffered
Six Lowest Counties
Counties
(Big Horn, Wheatland, Meagher, Car­
ter, Park and Jefferson) 
(Sheridan, Valley, Carter, Meagher, 
Phillips and Blaine)
(Teton, Blaine, Toole, Chouteau, 
Phillips and Hill)
(Ravalli, Blaine, Lewis and Clark, 
Custer and Valley)
Montana's Resources. 1917-1920.
Y ear Average
1916 12.90
1917 8 .10
1918 00 • 'O H
1919 12.81
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by the drought quite a little. I just returned from the
Shelby country and feel pretty well satisfied with the
country here. I didn*t sep a $pear of green grass in
that whole country and the grain in many places never
51sprouted at all.”
A year later Tewell informed Percy Abbey: "...things
are well dried out;..even the stock ranchers are going to 
have to ship about all of their cattle because of the 
shortage of hay and pasture. Rain coming now would make 
the feed pretty good, but the grain I think is shot."^2 
By 1921 agricultural conditions had not improved.
In August, Tewell wrote a stockholder: "The local situa­
tion, disappointing as it is from the view of our early 
expectations is paradise compared with some other sections 
of the country." He continued with a personal observa­
tion— "While this does not help us materially it seems 
there is enough meanness in the average human being so 
that he usually derives a little satisfaction, poor tho 
it is, from the fact that some other fellow has a heavier 
load to carry or a worse lot to s h a r e .  "“*3
51Letter, Tewell to Harry Lord, Aug. 14, 1918,
Gilman papers.
52Letter, Tewell to Abbey, July 8, 1919, Gilman papers.
53Letter, Tewpll to Reynolds, Aug. 10, 1921, Gilman
papers.
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The rainfall increased gradually from 1920 to 1923
on the Sun River, but the drought had already done its
d a m a g e . F a r m e r s ,  ranchers, merchants, and most of all
the bankers, all prayed for moisture. The 1919 edition
of the bulletin, The Resources and Opportunities of
Montana. expressed this feeling appropriately:
The people of the state are undaunted and are 
making the usual preparations for the season 
of 1920. It is pointed out that Montana has 
never before in its history had three seasons 
in succession as dry as the seasons of 1917,
1918 and 1919. From this it is argued that 
the state will surely come back in 1920.55
The state did come back, but it came back gradually. 
Agriculturally it was too late for the Gilman bank. De­
pendent on a narrow economy, inexperienced farmers who 
worked the poor soil on the bench and the uncertain years 
after 1917, the bank could not remain open. On November
54 TABLE 3
ANNUAL PRECIPITATION OF THE SUN 
RIVER PROJECT FROM 1920-1923;
MEASURED IN INCHES
Year Amount
1920 9.50
1921 10.25
1922 13.17
1923 15.83
Montana Experiment Station, An Analysis of the Present 
Status of Agriculture on the Sun River Irrigation Project. 
Bulletin 321 (Bozeman: Montana State College, 1936), 33.
Hereafter cited as Agriculture on the Sun River Irrigation 
Project. Bulletin 321.
ccMontana’s Resources. 1919, 6.
28, 1923, the bank’s officers closed the doors of the Gil­
man State Bank to be reopened in the hands of a receiver 
appointed by the state Superintendent of Banks.
Ill
Along with the surge in population the movement of 
the honyocker to the West rapidly increased the number of 
farms. From 1910 to 1920 Montana’s population increased by 
46 percent While the number of farms multiplied by 120 
percent.-* Lewis and Clark County showed a 38 percent 
addition in farms. By 1925 the state lost 19 percent of
TABLE 4
CHANGES IN THE NUMBER OF FARMS 
IN MONTANA DURING 
SELECTED YEARS
Year State Lewis and Clark Teton Cascade
1900 13,370 531 347 1,1441910 26,214 529 1,187 1,5021920 57,677 8 55 1,135 1,703
1925 46,904 543 1,089 1,2571930 47,495 612 1,023 1,404
U. S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920: Agriculture,
VI,- 106, and the U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
the Census, Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930» 
Agriculture, II, 118. Hereafter cited as Fourteenth Census 
of the United States, 1920: Agriculture. and the Fifteenth
Census of the United States, I.930* . Agriculture.
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the farms and Lewis arid Clark recorded a loss of almost 
one-third of all its farms* Of that number the majority 
of those failures in the county occurred from 1922-1925- 
The abandpnment of 273 o'f the county *s farms transpired 
during that time. Changes were not as dramatic in Teton 
and Cascade counties during this period.
The sudden loss of farms also drastically lowered 
the value of land. In 1921 a letter from the bank’s cashier 
to a loan company in Great Falls revealed the poor shape 
of one of the Gilman farmers. The letter read: ”We are
holding the land at $15-00 per acre. There are better 
than $1500 worth of improvements on the place and we es­
timate that it places the raw land at about $9.00 per 
ryacre. The Sun River Valley did not fair as well as the 
rest of the state in comparison of land value.
The average piece of land per acre in 1920 in the 
state (buildings included) was $22.15; by 1925 a loss of
cryLetter, Tewell to Lord, June 28, 1921, Gilman 
papers. This 310 acre plot was 25 miles northwest of 
Gilman in Teton county. It was probably a mixture of 
non-irrigated farming land and grazing land due to its 
location at the base of the Rocky Mountains. In 1920 
land varied in Teton county from $75 tp $100 an acre for 
irrigated land, $20 to $100 an acre for improved non­
irrigated tracts, and $8 to $15 an acre for grazing land. 
At $9 an acre for raw land the farmer was barely getting 
the minimum for grazing land. Montana’s Resources,
1920, 18 5-
6.1
5 ̂approximately $8.00 per acre occurred. This compared 
with a $7*00 loss in Lewis and Clark county, a $11.50 
loss in Teton and over a $17.00 decrease in Cascade.
This meant on the average a loss of approximately $1,500 
to $3,090 a farm. Such a loss could not be absorbed 
readily by farmers that were already in a precarious posi­
tion with their banker.
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Year
1920
1925
1930
State
$22.15
13.9111.81
TABLE 5
AVERAGE VALUE OF LAND AND 
BUILDING PER ACRE IN 
1920, 1925, and 1930
Lewis and Clark Teton
$18.44 $27.06
11.64 15.56
10.61 15.44
Cascade
$33-68
16 . 44 
17.20
Year
1920
1925
1930
State
$13,468
9,709
11,109
TABLE 6
AVERAGE VALUE OF LAND AND 
BUILDING PER FARM IN '
1920, 1925, and 1930
Lewis and Clark Teton Cascade
$16,264 • $14,628 $24,763
17,017 11,684 13,836
16,415 14,721 15,448
Fourteenth Census of the United States. 1920: Agri­
culture , VI, 106, and the Fifteenth Census of the United 
States, 1930 * Agriculture, II, 128.
For example, the typical Gilman farmer had a small 
320 acre farm, valued at $6,000, with a mortgage on it*
He usually owned a model^T Ford, 3 or 4 pieces of small 
machinery--a tractor and a plow, accompanied by small 
tools and garage equipment. He had 5 ho 10 head of cattle 
(which he hoped to sell to pay off his first bank note), 
a milk cow;, 100 tons of alfalfa and 80 to 100 acres 
planted in wheat. The farm also had various acres in 
potatoes, corn, rye, barley, and flax. The average farmer 
was barely making it in 1920 and with such a tremendous 
reduction in the value of land a reduction occurred in his 
ability to repay his loan or mortgage at the bank.
Some hope remained in the Sun River Canyon that land 
value would increase. This hope rested on oil speculation 
in the region. Drilling had become a common practice by 
1914 on the Sun River. When the dry years set in many 
Gilman residents believed that oil strikes would relieve 
the declining economy. Oil discoveries in Wyoming and 
north-central Montana gave encouragement to the Sun River 
land owners that their luck would change. Such was not 
the case for the area did not produce a single well— even 
today oil companies have continued to drill, but to no 
avail.
Stockholders and officers of the Gilnan bank, like 
the community’s citizens, also believed that oil might be
the secret fqr relieving the financial pressue in the 
valley. Although the bank did not invest in any such 
ventures many of the people that owed money to the bank 
participated in oil speculation. By 1918, C. W. Tewell 
revealed the disenchantment with the poor outlook in 
response to a letter inquiring about the oil drilling.
"It has been such a long winded business that I have lost 
some of my enthusiasm about it, but they ,/the oil compa- 
niejs/ seem to be stickers.1'^
A year later the situation had not improved and 
prompted one of the bank’s stockholders to write to Tewell: 
"I am sorry the oil well is at a standstill. Seems as 
tho the devil has a hand in preventing the completion of 
the well. Down 2000 ft, and now must abandon it!" Joking­
ly he noted, "I?ll bet they’ll find a German spy down there 
monkeying with those tools. Of course, there’s oil there, 
but there’s German interference."^
After 1919 prospects for oil promotion looked bleak.
C. W. Tewell, in correspondence with another stockholder, 
Charles G. Reynolds, commented about a local oil firm:
"I am afraid the Sun River Oil stock is a rather poor in­
vestment. They are doing nothing here and I cannot get a
coLetter, Tewell to Lord, Aug. 17, 1918, Gilman papery.
60Letter, Reynolds to Tewell, July 273 1919, Gilman
papers.
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word out of them. It would appear now as tho they were 
just a prqmotion company and organized just for the pur­
pose of selling stock.
A more successful firm from outside the region, the 
Wyomont Oil and Gas Company, quickly capitalized on the 
declining interest in Sun River Oil stocks. In a 1919 
form letter to the Sun River shareholders the Wyomont 
Company attempted to lure new customers by trading their 
stock for that of the "worthless” Montana corporation.
The letter stated:
The basis on which the stock will be exchanged 
is one for five— one share of Wyomont stock for 
five shares of Sun River. You will have fewer 
shares of the new stock than you had of the old, 
but the par value will be twice as much, and 
we firmly believe that the real value will soon 
be several times as m u c h .62
The failure in oil speculation, the decline in land 
value, and the subsequent days of meager rainfall accom­
panied the drop in agricultural prices. Wheat prices 
fell so drastically in Montana in 1919 that the state lost 
$50,000,000. Not only did drought effectively hamper 
production, but severe winters, lasting well into spring 
cut the production of grain crops.
f\ 1Letter, Tewell to Reynolds, Aug. 10, 1921, Gilman
papers.
62 . ,Letter, F. P. Motie (Secretary of the Wyomont Oil
and Gas Co.) to stockholders of Sun River Oil and Gas Co.,
April 11, 1919, Gilman papers.
63 Toole, Montana: An Uncommon Land, 235*6.
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A letter from Tewell to a corresponding bank in 
June 1918 stressed the problem of no moisture: '’Owing to
the long dry period of time we have had, the farmers on 
the benches around us will have short crops, especially 
will this be true of their winter wheat."^4 Three months 
later Tewell stressed that: "I think if the yield around
here will average ten bushels we will be doing well this 
year,"^, This compared with a state average of 12.3 bush-
1 66els per acre.
By 1919, in correspondence with Harry Lord, Tewell 
explained his concern about the outlook for wheat: "Our
grain crop here is practically nothing--the winter wheat 
in some places is running about 3 bushels per acre and 
the spring wheat as a rule ^jhas not been/ cut for feed.^ y
The feed shortage is, however, our greatest worry."
In 1919 Montana averages for wheat production fell under
ZL Ofive bushels per acre.
Mr. Tewell's fears for feed shortage were real ones.
f\ ALetter, Tewell to the Northwestern National Bank, 
Minneapolis, June 2 7, 1918, Gilman papers.
^Letter, Tewell to Lord, Sept. 24, 1918, Gilman papers. 
66Montana's Resources. 1919* 28.
67Letter, Tewell to Lord, Oct. 16, 1919, Gilman papers.
68Montana's Resources. 1920, 27.
The state shipped in nearly $45^000^000 worth of feed for
69livestock in 1919 to save the cattle and sheep industry.
Ranchers around Gilman were in the same predicament as
their fellow Montanans. Livestock owners in the area
bought slough grass that had been cut around the lakes of
Minnesota. This grass had. little nourishment but was
70still sold for as much as $50 a ton.
The price of cattle dropped correspondingly with the 
decrease in wheat. Many ranchers, like the wheat farmers, 
did not want to sell owing to the continuous decline in 
prices. They held out as long as possible but had to 
sell eventually to meet daily operating expenses and 
overdue bank loans. After 1919 Montana cattle herds 
dwindled. The state had over a million head of cattle 
and by 1920 the number totaled only 900,000. This loss o f ■ 
such magnitude meant a monetary loss of nearly $22,000,000.
Montana’s entire economy had been dramatically altered 
by the land and wheat boom during World War I« From '
1909 to 1925 Montana split its counties and increased the
^Elliott, "Commercial Bank Failures, 1920-1926," 50*
^Tape, Homer J. Wellman.
71Montana’s Resources. 1920, 36,
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number from 33 to 56. In that time the .influx of inex-̂  
perienced homesteaders into the state changed the whole 
complexion of Montana*s economy, and more drastically its 
banking structure. The Gilman State Bank was caught in 
this whirlwind of change. "Suffice it to say that it was 
an enormously costly experiment...thus when the drought
came— -and with it the grasshoppers; even the cutworm com-
7 2peted with the homesteader for control."''6
72Dalich, "Dry Farming Promotion, 1907-1916," 85.
CHAPTER III
LOAN FACTORS OF 
THE BANK
I
Loans played the major role in the operation of the 
Gilman State Bank during the days of the honyockers. This 
loan experience was of three types. First of all, eastern 
bank inquiries for local bank and farm loans before 1918 
were very important. Secondly, when the dry years pre­
vailed the Gilman bank requested loans from these eastern 
banking corporations and used local loans as collateral 
for the money it borrowed; Thirdly, to forestall bank­
ruptcy, local farmers flooded the Gilman bank with loan 
requests.
As a new bank in the state in 1910 the Augusta State 
Bank received many letters of inquiry from eastern banks 
concerning its affiliation with them as a correspondent 
bank. Many of the large banks in New York, Chicago and 
Minneapolis served as correspondent banks for those in 
the west that did not belong to the Federal Reserve System. 
This made it possible for western institutions to borrow 
at a low rate of ipterest and have their loans rediscounted.
^Rediscount. This is a transaction undertaken by one 
bank desiring funds from another bank. By this means the 
bank desiring funds presents a discount (a note it has ac­
cepted from a customer to run for a specified length of 
time) to another bank in order to get an advance. In turn,
68
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The National City Bank, of Chicago (a bank only three 
years old), wrote a typical letter in March^l910 inquir­
ing about the Augusta bank as a correspondent: "While
sentiment cuts very little figure in the banking business 
as a general proposition, we feel that, all things being 
equal, there should be a 'fellow feeling' between new 
b a n k s . T h i s  bank, like the other eastern banks, offer­
ed to pay 2 percent interest annually on money placed in 
its bank. These banks also loaned money to western insti­
tutions at a rate of 6 percent, usually for a 60-90 day 
period.
Insurance companies also realized the potential of 
the western states and had their own methods of tapping 
this resource. The New World Life Insurance Company, as 
one example, proposed a plan of mutual benefit for itself 
and the newly formed bank. "Its a businessman's proposi­
tion, 'pure and simple,'" the plan stated. "We have the 
money to deposit with you right now, provided we can do 
so on reciprocal terms. We will put a substantial de­
posit in your bank provided that you will help us get in-
the bank which presents the note for rediscount endorses 
it, thereby guaranteeing that it will be paid at maturity. 
H. Parker Willis, American Banking (Chicago: Chicago,
LaSalle Extension University, 1916), 165.
2Letter, Elmer E. Whittaker to Abbey, April 12, 1910, 
Gilman papers.
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surance either by acting as an agent of the Company your­
self, or helping us secure an active agent to do this 
work in your locality.”^
Surety firms,4 likewise, had an interest in reaping 
the resources from.the newly arriving homesteaders. The 
Wells-Dickey Company of Minneapolis handled such a tre­
mendous volume of farm mortgages and municipal bonds in 
central Montana that it opened a branch office in 1913 
in Great Falls. Six months after they had established 
themselves local agents informed the Gilman bank officers: 
"No loan is too small and none too large for our considera­
tion, if the margin of security is sufficient and the man 
behind the gun worthy of credit.”^
Other companies were just as willing to extend 
credit but were more selective on the type of loans they
3Letter, New World Life Insurance Co. to Abbey, July 
9, 1914* Gilman papers.
^Surety. This is a financial institution which 
operates in the commercial field as an acceptance house. 
The company does not advance funds, but only guarantees 
the credit of the drawer by accepting true obligations 
drawn against them, which are later sold in the financial 
market. The purchasers of these obligations advance the 
funds and the acceptance house acts only in the capacity 
of guarantor. Luther Harr and W. Carlton Harris, Banking 
Theory and Practice (New York and London: MaGraw-HilL
Book Co. Inc., 1936), 18.
^Letter, Edwin H. Jones to the Augusta State Bank, 
Aug. 28,. 1913^ Gilman papers.
would, handle from the farmers# Keeler Brothers, a Den­
ver firm that desired to accommodate large borrowers,
requested only ten year loans, "...as the livestock pro-
*
ducer then has ample time to increase his herd to where 
his entire debt can be easily paid, and the cattle which 
are sold can be held for the most favorable market." "On 
a short term loan," the company stressed, "it is not un­
common that ./the rancher^/ is forced to sell his cattle
off the range to meet maturing obligations."^
This is exactly what happened during the dry era.
The outside banks and investors, following sound business 
principles, Wanted loans only during good times and for 
long periods. The short term loans did not prove produc­
tive enough, and in the dry years they were too risky.
One firm in 1914 requested that "...farm loans be
nmade upon improved farms only." This meant that the 
company handled loans only on land that had one quarter 
of the claim under cultivation. In 1916 the Banking Cor­
poration of Montana requested only specialized loans.
The company wanted "mixed farming loans ranging from 
$10,000 to $250>000. By mixed farming the company meant 
lands devoted to hay, grain for feed and various livestock
Letter, Keeler Brothers to the Gilman State Bank, 
March 6, 1916, Gilman papers.
7Letter, R. H. Carstens to Abbey, Feb. 27, 1914, 
Gilman papers.
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oproduction.” Still other companies desired loans on 
cattle ranches that maintained a certain number of head. 
They loaned on amounts usually over $5/000.
The specialization of these loans--mixed farming 
loans, improved loans, big business loans over $10,000, 
long term loans, and cattle loans— made the borrowing of 
money extremely easy for the homesteaders. Outside cor­
porations did a good business and they left enough small 
loans for the bank in Gilman so that everyone prospered. 
However, when these companies refused to extend loans dur­
ing the troubled years, it placed financial pressure on 
the local bank. The Gilman bank had to handle all of the 
loans, .in addition to the ones deemed too small by eastern 
corporations.
When prosperity vanished these companies were no 
longer eager to help the "western homesteader." In 1920 
the Gilman State Bank received a letter from the Portland 
Cattle Loan Company that politely refused any offers for 
future loans. "Due to the large amount of commitments 
and the present tightening of the money market, it would 
be impossible for us to consider the good business which 
you offer at this time."^
Q Letter, George L. Ramsey to the Gilman State Bank, 
June 1, 1916, Gilman papers.
9Letter, W. A. Willis to the Gilman State Bank,
May 19, 1920, Gilman papers.
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Another cattle company was a bit more direct: ’’The
present uncertainty of the money market and financial 
outlook _/makes it/ necessary for us to demand retirement 
of our loans at maturity provided security can be liquidated 
without loss.1' The company concluded, noting: "There is
no market for commercial paper /promissory notes;/ — con­
sequently there is no other alternative than liquidation.""^
The key to this type of business was that these com­
panies waited for the loans to mature, hoping they did 
not take a loss. Such companies handled so many loans, 
in so many different regions, that a loss on one loan in 
Gilman was just written off the books. However, this was 
not as eass' for the Gilman bank. Since the loans were 
restricted to a single region the bank could not depend 
on loans in other areas to keep the bank solvent. The 
only way to accomplish solvency was to continue advancing 
second and third loans hoping for good weather and the 
eventual repayment of all the loans.
At its formation the bank also received a completely 
different type of inquiry from a Council Bluffs company 
that specialized in bank stocks. Rather than an inquiry 
concerning loans the Iowa firm requested to buy out the 
newly formed bank. The company wondered if the Augusta
Letter, Spokane Cattle Loan Co. to the Gilman 
State Bank, May 19, 1920, Gilman papers.
bank "would like to have private aid in disposing of its 
present banking interests?” It promised quiet negotia­
tions and stressed that there was no need to "...fear a
11violation of confidence."
Several weeks later in a follow-up letter the same 
company suggested that "...even you may have had the 
opportunity to go into a larger bank and have turned it 
down because of the fear of publicity in disposing of 
your present banking interests." The letter continued, 
” ...bank selling at first blush would seem to be an un­
heard of thing. In times gone by a banker simply had to 
hang on to his bank because there was no reliable house 
through whom he could quietly sell." The company advised 
"Do not think that it is necessary to hunt for buyers 
after you consent to sell. We have hundreds of them 
anxious to locate at once in your section of the coun­
try."12
The author of the letter from the Council Bluffs 
company was wrong in presupposing that bankers* attitudes 
— particularly A. L. Bradley*s--had changed concerning 
the retainment of their small banks. Very few bankers,
Letter, R. W. Walters to the Augusta State Bank, 
Oct. 10, 1911, Gilman papers.
12Letter, R. W. Walters to the Augusta State Bank, 
Oct. 27t 1911, Gilman papers.
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or stockholders for that matter, sold to outside clear­
ing houses. Most of these banks had been started by- 
local residents for their convenience, as well as for 
the small profits they returned. More importantly, these 
bank officials had a moral obligation to the community 
and selling their bank was out of the question.
The Gilman State Bank and its personnel rigidly 
followed this philosophy. Since it was the bank officials 
that were instrumental in starting the town of Gilman it 
would be illogical to assume that these men were anything 
but faithful to their bank. Bradley was unlike other 
bank presidents because he had his reputation staked on 
the success or failure of the community. He felt that 
the success of the town relied heavily on the success of 
the bank, and did all he could to keep the bank’s doors 
open .
For all his manipulations to establish Gilman, making 
enemies in the process, Mr. Bradley can never be accused 
of failing the town or the bank. Although he lacked ex­
perience in banking and knowledge about wheat farming, 
he made up for it in organization and his willingness to 
sacrifice friendship to achieve one goal— making Gilman 
the most prosperous community in the Sun River Valley.
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II
The second factor that had a significant part in 
the bank’s loan experience involved the direct borrowing 
from other banking institutions. The Gilman State Bank 
was no exception and utilized this opportunity only during 
certain times of the year. These loans could be obtained 
on long or short terms, but the usual terms were up to 
90 days. In 1918 in a typical letter stating the Gilman 
bank’s position, C, W. Tewell wrote to an Illinois bank: 
MIt has been our practice to borrow during the spring and 
summer months to take care of the demands on us and we 
take up in the fall when the cattle shipments are made to 
the Chicago markets. 3
From 1918 onward the reduction in agricultural pro­
ductivity forced the local farmers to make constant de­
mands on the Gilman bank for loans. The complexion of 
seasonal borrowing vanished. The demands by area farmers 
for financial relief compelled the bank to seek aid from 
its correspondent banks.
In August 1919> Tewell wrote to the First National 
Bank of Great Falls (its correspondent bank in Montana)
"^Letter, Tewell to H. R. Drew, Oct. 25» 1918, Gil­
man papers.
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to handle some cattle loans. At that time Tewell stated 
he expected loans to be ’’...larger than /the bank/ could 
c a r r y S a m  Stephenson, then president of the First 
National Bank, replied that his bank could not carry the 
loans due to the ’’...unsettled conditions of the times.
Two months later the state bank in Gilman wrote a 
similar letter to its corresponding bank in Illinois (The 
First National Bank of Joliet) requesting a renewal on 
its $15*000 in certificates of deposit.^ The bank agreed 
to renew the certificates for one year at a rate of 6 per­
cent .^7
On December 17* 1919* Tewell requested help from 
another corresponding bank (The Northwest National Bank 
of Minneapolis). He commented: "The unusually hard and
"^Letter, Tewell to the First National Bank of Great 
Falls, Aug. 15* 1919* Gilman papers.
"^Letter, Sam Stephenson to the Gilman State Bank,
Aug. 19* 1919* Gilman papers.
16 Letter, Tewell to the First National Bank of Joliet, 
Oct. 17* 1919* Gilman papers. Certificates of deposit. 
Certificates of deposit are issued by banks for money left 
on deposit for short or long time periods. These deposits 
are payable on demand or at a stated time and usually draw 
interest at a stated rate. A certificate of deposit is 
an elastic instrument, through which a bank may accommodate 
the customer who desires interest on deposits that are not 
likely to remain until the close of interest periods in 
the savings department. William H. Kniffin, Commercial 
Banking (New York: MaGraw-Hill Book Co. Inc.^ 192 3)* 477.
•^Letter, Harry R. Drew to Tewell, Oct. 21* 1919* 
Gilman papers.
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early winter has created a heavy demand on us for money. 
For an ordinary year we estimated we had a sufficient 
cash reserve to carry us partly thru the seeding season 
but the high prices for feeds have made heavy inroads 
in that." He continued by requesting a loan to aid in 
the bank's relief: "Can you take us for ten or fifteen
-I Othousand dollars?" The bank readily accepted the loan 
on a 6 percent annual basis.^
That same day Tewell sent an exact duplicate letter 
to the First National Bank of St. Paul. The reply was 
much the same. The Minnesota bank agreed on the loan pro­
vided its correspondent in Montana backed the notp with 
good collateral.^
The refusal by the bank in Great Falls to aid the 
Gilman bank, and the help offered by the three mid-western 
banks, lends credence to the economic problems at that 
time. Montana banks in 1919 had reached the stage where 
loans of any type— be they loans to fellow banks, or the 
acceptance of farm loans for collateral on certificates of 
deposit— were no longer assets, but liabilities.
l8Letter, Tewell to R. W. MacGregor, Dec. 17, 1919, Gilman papers.
19Letter, MacGregor to Tewell, Dec. 22, 1919, Gil­
man papers.
20 Letter, M. Skinner to Tewell, Dec. 22, 1919,Gilman papers.
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After 1919 the predicament of the Gilman State Bank 
paralleled the fate of other Montana banks, These insti­
tutions had borrowed and loaned to such an extent they 
stayed above water because they floated on their own com­
mercial paper. This, however, was not good enough for 
eastern organizations. They desired only profitable re­
turns on money invested in the West, and it proved an in­
surmountable task for the Gilman bank to forestall these 
companies for time to recover*
Responding to a request from a Minneapolis surety 
company to pay off its deposit, C. W. Tewell replied:
"We realize that you are not in the loaning business and 
that you have paid this money out and want it back. We 
believe also you can understand our situation here and 
that payment at this time would work a severe hardship 
on us. We therefore are compelled to ask you to carry 
this for us until fall."^
In the letter the Gilman Bank enclosed a $1,000 check 
covering the payment on the principal and the interest on 
the deposit. This maneuver, intended to persuade the com­
pany to leave its deposit in the bank, caused the Gilman 
officials to comment: ’’This i(3 a small payment but it rep-
21Letter, Tewell to Harrison B. Martin, May 5* 1922, 
Gilman papers.
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resents quite a little cash at this time. We want to 
state too that if consideration is shown in extending us 
this needed time we will use every effort to clean this 
up as rapidly as we can."^ It was a sad situation when 
the bank had difficulty even paying the interest on a time 
deposit, let alone paying back the entire amount of the 
deposit.
The Gilman State Bank had reached such straits that
an abundance of letters continually flowed from the bank
to institutions outside of Montana requesting funds. These
letters usually read: "It is useless to call on our
Montana correspondents for cash so we feel obliged to
call on you to extend us a little credit for a short 
23time."
The changed attitude of one of the eastern investors 
in Illinois brought the typical reply to the Gilman bank 
officials:
I was able to deposit money in western banks for 
a good many years as this money represented sur­
plus funds which we did not need to use at that 
time in our community.
1 always endeavored to let my friends in Montana 
and the other western states know that these 
were surplus funds which we might some time ^/sic/ 
have to use in our immediate vicinity, although 
at that time I could' not see far enough ahead to 
realize to what extent this might be necessary.
As a real matter of fact, I had to draw in all
22Ibid.
2 1Letter, Tewell to Lord, July 30, 1923, Gilman papers.
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my deposits with western banks* which at one
time amounted to between $4*000,000 and $5*000,000.
I don't want you to feel that we merely deserted 
the ship in the west at the time you needed help 
as we have never considered our deposits of money 
on certificates quite in the same light as an 
active banking relationship and I don't believe 
that you so considered them."24
In March^l922* the Wells-Dickey Company, in a similar 
predicament, wrote to A. L. Bradley informing him of the
changed attitude of its investors: "Some of them are assum­
ing a threatening attitude... and it will be impossible to 
hold them off any longer. We regret it will be necessary 
for us to start foreclosure on some loans, and the only 
way to forestall such action will be for you to make good 
at once.'1̂
The persistence of the Wells-Dickey firm in collecting 
overdue notes is displayed in a 1922 letter— this one from 
a farmer at Riebling, 10 miles east of Gilman. "I just 
received a letter from Wells-Dickey Co. Gt. Falls and they 
can't wait eny longer for there money. I git a letter 
from them every time I go to the Post office giving me 
Hell." He requested the bank to "...fix things up with 
as they Bother me to death.
^Letter, F. W. Woodruff to Tewell, Oct. 30* 1922, 
Gilman papers.
25Letter, R. J. Stallman to Bradley, March 10, 1922* 
Gilman papers.
A Lfetter, C. A. Larson to the Gilman State Bank,
March 13* 1922* Gilman papers.
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The pressure of these surety firms prompted the 
state Bank examiner to write the companies. He stated: 
"This department is informed that bonds are refused on 
original application, renewal of risks refused and bopds 
terminated or cancelled on too short notice." Further, 
"...hope is held out that renewal will be forthcoming 
until the last moment and finally refused; unreasonable 
demands and requirements are made and impossible condi­
tions imposed." More importantly, the "...failure of 
banks might be traced to refusal to renew at the last mo­
ment, when as a matter of fact the company did not in-
2 7tend to renew from the very beginning."
Unlike these companies the Gilman State Bank was 
not as quick to foreclose on local farmers and ranchers, 
and was more willing to extend delinquent loan payments.
The bank foreclosed on a farm only when the owner was 
in such a predicament that he was ready to file for bank­
ruptcy. In addition, it was not uncommon that the bank 
extended a third or even fourth loan to those farmers who 
needed money, only so he could go deeper into debt.
Immediate foreclosures of farms and ranches, rather 
than continued extension of loans, was the simple solution. 
However, the good of the community had to be considered
^Letter, L. Q. Skelton to the Gilman State Bank, 
Nov. 301 1921', Gilman papers.
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and bank officials thought about these people first, 
rather than the welfare of the bank. It is ironic that 
to keep the town of Gilman strong Bradley depended on 
the bank to show the leadership. But it had to have 
people— dependable and reliable workers, preferably—  
to even maintain a town. Consequently, Bradley had to 
make a choice between his bank or Gilman*s homesteaders—  
he chose to help the latter.
Had Bradley reacted like other community bankers, 
and worried only about his bank, the state bank of Gilman 
might have survived. But, in this instance, Bradley 
thought more about his town. The bank in Augusta also 
failed, but the town survived. The bank officials and 
directors did show concern for the farmers to whom they 
loaned, but unlike Bradley, they placed more concern on 
their bank.
In any case, it is illogical that either bank would 
h^ve survived under the circumstances. Two banks in an 
area that supported no more than 1,500 people had no chance 
for survival. The population, combined with the agri­
cultural and economic conditions of the time, makes it 
improbable that even a single bank in the region would 
have.stayed open.
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III
The third consideration of the bankfs loan experi­
ence involved'the local farmers' pleas for aid. The 
good years preceding the drought did not necessitate 
an excessive number of loan requests from local Gilman 
ranchers. The drought did not reach the Sun River area 
until 1918 and farmers that borrowed money before that 
time relied on the bank for only small loans. After that 
time out of state companies ceased to loan to western 
farmers because of unstable collateral. Local residents 
then besieged the Gilman bank with loan requests. Since 
these homesteaders had begun farming on big hopes and 
small pocketbooks they turned to the local bank for help.
The plight of these farmers is best summed up in 
the 1919 edition of The Resources and Opportunities of 
Montana. The journal stated; "It is not advisable to 
locate on a homestead in any case unless the settler has 
a sufficient supply of funds to carry him through. For
28a man with a family this should not be less than $2,000."
In a 1927 survey taken by the Experimental Station of
28Montana's Resources, 1919, 20.
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Montana State College it revealed that the typical 
rancher in the Sun River Valley on a 100 acre plot
cleared $416 a year. On a 160 acre claim he cleared
2 9$1,433* In neither case was the amount cleared anywhere 
near the minimum $2,000 suggested.
The aniount increased, however, for those who owned 
more land, but even on the average 320 acre farm the 
additional income was not enough to offset the staggering 
drop in agricultural prices. More importantly the small 
income of the farmers made it financially impossible for 
them to meet the loan payments due at their community 
bank.
Compounding the difficulty of the farmers in meet­
ing loan payments was the corresponding drop in p a r i t y . 3° 
"During the five years 1916-1920 Montana farm wheat 
prices averaged 57 percent above parity." However, ” ... 
during the years 1922-1926, when bankruptcies were 
heaviest, Montana wheat prices averaged 4 percent below
29Agriculture on the Sun River Irrigation Pro.iect, 
Bulletin 32l, 53~9
30Parity. This is a system of regulating prices of 
farm commodities, usually by government price supports, 
to provide farmers with the same purchasing price they 
had in a selected base year. Random House Dictionary of 
the English Language, ed. by Jess Stein(New Y o r k : R a n ­
dom House Inc., 1967), 1049.
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71parity.,TJ The drop in wheat prices faster than the
drop in prices of commodities farmers bought placed im­
possible burdens on the homesteaders. Since there was 
no increase in production the loss in net prices accom­
panied the reduction in the farmers' incomes.
In June*1918* loans in the Gilman State Bank were 
$151*000 and deposits were $131,000.^2 Two years later 
on the June-1920 condition report loans reached the high­
est ever— $237*000. Deposits increased by oyer $52*000 
to $183*000. In that short time loans had increased 
60 percent while deposits were up 40 percent. In March 
of that year overdue notes totaled $18,000 and all rated 
as being slow. There were no recordings in the doubt­
ful or loss columns in the report.^
By September} 1921* even though the total amount of 
loans dropped to $189*000, over one-quarter of all the
31Montana Experiment Station, Montana Farm Bank­
ruptcies, Bulletin 36O (Bozeman: Montana State College*
1938), 48. Hereafter cited as Montana Farm Bankrupt­
cies, Bulletin 360.
32Gilman Condition Report. June 29* 1918.
33Ibid., June 30, 1920.
"^Letter, h . S. MaGraw to the Gilman State Bank, 
March 2* 1920, Gilman papers.
bank's loans were overdue— $54,000 Of that total 
the list in the slow column was $36,000; doubtful re­
payments were $4,000; and those considered as a total 
loss reached $2,000— the latter was a conservative es­
timate of unreclaimed loans.^ The remaining $12,000, 
mostly loans less than three months overdue, were con­
sidered as being subject to repayment.
Finally on November 27, 1923, the closing condition 
report for the bank listed $196,000 in loans and dis­
counts. Of that figure $140,000 fell into the good column 
$9,000 as doubtful for repayment; and $47,000 as a total 
loss— this was nearly one-quarter of all the bank's loans. 
After the bank's closure it became the responsibility of 
the newly appointed receiver, George H. Minson, to collect 
the overdue notes and those that would come due in the 
future.
In a 1921 letter from the Banking Corporation of 
Montana the company chastised these delinquent farm mort­
gage borrowers in hopes of repayment. nWe have been carry
~̂*Gilman Condition Report. Sept. 6, 1921.
36, Letter, L. Q. Skelton to the Gilman State Bank, 
Sept. 15, 1921, Gilman papers.
37Gilman Condition Report, Nov. 27, 1923, Gilman
papers.
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ing you for some time £si.cj at considerable expense and 
this year we expect, and must have, an adjustment.”
iFurther, ..you perhaps owe your local bank, grocery, 
hardware, lumber dealers and others. In making settlement, 
please keep prominently in mind the fact that your farm, 
your home, is the boss of your earning power.” In ending 
the company advised: ”The mortgage on your home, interest
on this mortgage and the taxes against these lands must be 
taken care o f .”3®
No one knew this better than the Gilman homesteaders, 
but they could do nothing to alter the situation. When 
a farmer went bankrupt it was a personal admission of 
his hopeless state of affairs. This acted as a deterrent 
for many of these people who had strong ambitions and 
unusually intense personal pride. Consequently, they 
struggled on against great odds only to find too frequently 
that in the end they were unable to repay their loans and
IQthe creditors forced liquidation through foreclosure.0
To better understand this problem of bank loans a 
study made by the Montana Experiment Station of five cen­
tral Montana counties is extremely helpful (Teton and
^8Letter, The Banking Corporation of Montana to 
delinquent farm mortgage borrowers, Aug. 5j 1921, Gil­
man papers.
^Montana Farm Bankruptcies, Bulletin 360, 9.
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Cascade counties included). Made over a twenty-two year 
period (1911-1933)> the study concluded that, "...land 
productivity and loan experience were closely related."
The report revealed: "Loans were not successfully ad­
justed to the productivity and debt-carrying capacity 
of the farm— an indication that poor lands were greatly 
overappraised while good lands were underappraised.
No where was this more correct than in the case of 
the Gilman bank. The bank's officers did make periodic 
trips to local ranches and farms, but neither Bradley,
Abbey, nor Tewell possessed any real knowledge about wheat 
farming or cattle ranching. Bradley had spent several 
years in North Dakota as a farmer, but this was during a
4
time when drought and falling prices seldom occurred.
The only real experience these men had in evaluating a 
farm's capacity occurred during their association with the 
bank. They, like the homesteaders, knew nothing about dry 
land farming or the raising of livestock under such condi­
tions .
Another report undertaken by the Station to determine 
the cause of farm bankruptcies reached a similar conclusion.
40Montana Experiment Station, Farm Mortgage Loan Ex­
perience in Central Montana, Bulletin 372 (Bozeman: Mont­
ana State College, 1939), 2. The five Montana counties
included in the survey were Cascade, Chouteau, Fergus,
Judith Basin and Teton.
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"The first and most important step towards a sounder loan 
procedure is the determination of the productivity value 
or true worth of lands based upon 3 scientific soil sur­
vey and average yields and prices, to be used as the basis 
for lending,
Here the problem rested for the bank never undertook 
a survey of the land productivity in the region or adjusted 
the appraisal of good and poor lands. The bank’s offi­
cials made the majority of the loans based on the abilities 
and character of the man. The only majop consideration 
taken at all on the land, naturally depended on whether 
it could be irrigated.
From 1910 to the bank’s failure in 1923* loans 
greatly affected the operation of the state bank of Gil­
man. In the end it was this poor loan experience that 
contributed significantly to the bank’s closing. Delin­
quent farm loans, compounded by the demands of eastern 
institutions for repayment, placed the bank in the middle 
of two immovable forces. Lack of experience by bank 
officials in loaning in no way alleviated the problem 
and also played an instrumental role in the bank’s failure.
41Montana Farm Bankruptcies. Bulletin 36O, 50*
CHAPTER IV
FINANCIAL FACTORS 
OF THE BANK
I
The failure of the Gilman State Bank on November 
28, 1923j followed very closely the failure of other 
banks in Montana. The bank remained financially sound 
until 1918, but after that time the drain on deposits 
and the ^xtenion of loans caused a gradual decline in 
the bank’s stability. This proved to be the same case 
for the majority of the state’s banking institutions.
Ironically the rival Peoples Bank of Augusta closed 
its doors on December 22, 1923, less than one month after 
the bank in Gilman folded. When examining certain as­
pects of the Gilman bank’s closure it would be foolish 
to ignore the condition of the Peoples Bank in the 
neighboring community. Not only were these two banks 
located in the same area, but they depended primarily 
on the same regional economy.
The December 6, 1923 edition of the Augusta News 
reported:
The Gilman State Bank, ’The Bank of Friendly 
Service,’ failed to open its door for business 
last Friday morning by action of the Board of 
Directors. While it is claimed that this ac-
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tion was taken to protect the depositors and 
that the bank will reopen and pay dollar for 
dollar, it is the general opinion that the in­
stitution is past all stage of redemption and 
estimates as to its ability to pay out run as 
low as ten cents on the dollar.
In retrospect, three weeks later on December 27,
the same paper reported the Augusta bank’s failure:
The Peoples Bank of Augusta was closed last 
Saturday morning by order of the State Super­
intendent of Banks after an examination by Co 
E. Cleave. The bank was closed after a most 
strenuous effort on the part of directors to 
keep it open in which effort a few men have sac­
rificed much of both time and money.
A steady drain on the bank’s resources since 
the close of the Gilman bank caused its fail­
ure. Since that time oyer $25,000 have passed 
out of the Augusta institution and to the last 
moment local men were ready and willing to put 
up their money to save the bank.
It is an awful blow to the community and will 
not be felt to its fullest extent for some 
time. The bank will undoubtedly pay out dol­
lar for dollar and the possibility of reorgan­
izing is not abandoned.^
The closure of the Augusta and Gilman banks started 
rumors of other bank failings in the valley. Only five 
weeks after the Augusta bank had closed its doors a no­
tice of correction appeared in the Augusta News:
^Augusta News. Dec. 6, 1923* 
2Ibid.. Dec. 2 7., 1923 .
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The News last week contained the announcement 
that the 'State Bank of Simms expresses a 
desire to discontinue its business and invites 
its depositors to come in and get their money»'
Now it happens that there is no * State Bank of 
Simms' or never has beenj the only bank at Simms 
being the 'Sun River Valley State Bank.1 This 
bank has no intention of quitting business.
We do not care to say where our information lead­
ing to the publication of the item came from but 
it was common talk about town the forepart of; 
last week.
Rumors continued to spread and in one respect the 
banks themselves were to blame. Banks used to close at 
every opportunity, this was especially the case for holi­
days. Bank officials, for example, usually hung a sign 
on the door that said--"Bank Closed"— and in finer print 
"For Washington's Birthday." After the banks started to 
close people passed these buildings and read the sign 
in the window— "Bank Closed"— and that was as far as they 
went. This immediately started a run on the bank. For 
that reason banks today generally announce— "This Bank 
will observe Washington's Birthday."^
The failure of these two upper Sun River banks greatly 
affected the people in the region, both financially and 
emotionally. In addition to this fact the failure of the
^Ibid. . Jan. 31, 1924. The Sun River Valley State 
Bank received its charter on June 10, 1913, and volun­
tarily liquidated on March 1, 1937.
4Tape, Homer J. Wellman.
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Gilman State Bank and its rival Augusta bank can be con­
sidered good examples of Montana banks that folded during 
the 1920,s. Both banks fall into categories that are 
representative of the majority of the state’s commercial 
banks that closed during this era.
The Peoples Bank of Augusta and the Gilman State Bank 
were state rather than national banks. From 1921-1925 
’’...the percentage of state bank failures was higher than 
those for national banks.”5
In four of those five years the ratio of state banks 
failing as compared with national banks was two to one.
Also, neither bank belonged to the Federal Reserve System; 
non-member banks failed more often than member banks.
Size in determining bank failures was another impor­
tant factor. For state banks that failed the average
capitalization in Montana was $36,000; for banks that did
7 -not fail, capitalization was $47,500. The Augusta bank,
upon its failure, had $40,000 in capital stock, while that
8of the Gilman bank was $25*000. The banks in the state 
with capital of $20,000-$30,000 represented almost one-half
■^Elliott, ’’Commercial Bank Failures, 1920-1926,” 19.
^Ibid., 22.
7Ibid.
8State Examiners Report for the State of Montana, June3 
192 2. Hereafter cited as State Examiners Report (with given 
year).
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of all the bank failures in Montana. Ninety-five of the 
214 banks that failed fell into this category.9
Total resources of a bank were also an important 
guide when comparing Montana’s financial disaster— on 
the average, local state banks that failed had resources 
totaling $563>000. Those that did not fail had re­
sources of $983,000.10 The Augusta bank had slightly 
more resources on June 30, 1922, than did the Gilman 
State Bank; $323,000 to $264,000 respectively.'*7'*' Fifteen 
months later in September 1923 the Gilman bank’s re­
sources dropped drastically to $207,000.'*'^
Amounts of total time and demand deposits were use­
ful in measuring bank closures. The twenty-?-seventh annual 
report of the State Examiner, released in June,1922, re­
ported that the Peoples Bank of Augusta maintained only 
$128,000, while the Gilman bank totaled $143,000.'*'^
The average for those state banks that failed was 
$205,000.'*'^ In both cases, the Gilman and Augusta banks’
9Elliott, "Commercial Bank Failures, 1920-1926," 23.
10Ibid.
11State Examiners Report, Junej192 2. 
l2Gilman Condition Report, Sept. 14, 1923.
13State Examiners Report, June^l922.
"^Elliott, "Commercial Bank Failures, 1920-1926," 23.
deposits were considerably lower than other failing banks.
”5ince a bank primarily serves its local area, the 
location of failing and non-failing banks is an important 
part of the failure pattern. Generally, failing banks 
were located in smaller communities--58 percent of Montana 
bank failures occurred in communities of less than 500
1 cpopulation.” At the time of the two banks1 failures 
neither community could claim a population much over 500.
In addition, the location of these two banks east 
of the Continental Divide plaped them in an area dependent 
on agriculture, as compared with western Montana that 
relied on mining and forestry. ’’The area in Montana east 
of the Continental Divide experienced the failure of 56.4 
percent of its banks during the 1920-1926 period, in the 
area west of the Divide, 38.5 percent of the banks failed. 
Thus, those banks in eastern Montana, dependent on an 
unstable agricultural economy, were more susceptible to 
failure than their counterparts across the Divide.
The length a bank had been established in a commu­
nity represented still another determining factor lending 
keys to the investigation of Montana's commercial bank
failures. Of the 214 banks that collapsed, 73 received
1 7charters from the state in the years 1910-1914* This 
was over pne-third of all the banks; the Gilman and
15Ibid., 25-6. 
l6Ibid.. 76.
17Ibid.. 27.
Augusta banks fit into this category. Such a comparison 
revealed that "...failing banks were not as well estab­
lished and were newer institutions than non-failing banks.
A final consideration when comparing the Gilman and 
Augusta bank failures with other Montana banks deals with 
the dependence on a local one-crop economy and the lack 
of diversification. The two Sun River Valley banks in 
times of prosperity were better off than most banks.
Since the economy of the Sun River area was almost equally 
divided between livestock and grain crops, good revenue 
in one area offset failing prices in the other.
However, this was not the case after 1917, for both 
wheat and livestock prices plummeted. Farmers who had 
borrowed money to buy new equipment for harvesting could 
not depend on adequate returns from the sale of their 
cattle (and in some cases sheep) to cover their losses. 
These men continued to borrow from the Augusta and Gilman 
banks in hopes of returning to more prosperous days.
1 8 I b i d .
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II
Excluding the Augusta Bank, many financial factors 
concerning deposits greatly influenced the failure of 
the state bank in Gilman. First of all, the most impor­
tant aspect of deposits when examining the bank’s fin­
ancial status was the loan to deposit ratio. The majority
1of the banks that failed during this period had loan to 
deposit ratios between 100 and 200 percent. This trend
was more pronounced in the small country banks than it
was in the urban banjcs . The Gilman bank was no exception
in this matter.
The years 1910 to 1916 revealed a slow increase in
loans with a proportionate increase in depos its.-̂ 9 Dur-
19 TABLE 7
Gilman State Bank (1910-1923)
LOANS TO TOTAL DEPOSITS RATIO Loan to
Total Total DepositsYear Lo ans Deposits Ratio
1910 $ 13,701.45 $ 23,758*81 .58
1911 48,571*76 37,030.65 1.31
1912 48,392.34 42,044.69 1.15
1913 56,814.62 44,438.92 1.29
1914 74,68-7.65 70,136.89 1.07
1915 77,795.93 57,725.03 1.351916 75,975.41 76,321.55 1.00
1917 124,104.09 120,653.15 1.02
1918 150,904.06 131,127.07 1.15
1919 199,901.50 202,339.56 .99
1920 236,913.32 183,470.32 1.30
1921 186,518.80 145,049.52 1.29
1922 213,793.25 143,066.57 1.50
1923 202,869.67 119,465.31 1.67
Gilman Condition Reports, June reports 1910-1923*
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ing this seven year period the loan—deposit ratio averaged 
about 120 percent. The picture changed, however, in 1918 
when the drought reached the Gilman area and loans in the 
community*s bank increased by over $25>000. Deposits 
also increased t*ut not at the rapid rate that loans followed. 
This caused a steady increase in the loan-deposit ratio.
In 1918 optimism prevailed in the minds of the bank 
officials. They disregarded sound banking practices 
by over-extending the bank’s loans. These men believed 
the drought would not continue and the Gilman bank would 
regain its losses in future years.
Better times did not return and by 1919 loans 
reached nearly $200,000. Deposits were over that fig- 
ure--$202,000. The following year the ratio jumped to 
130 percent and from that time on the bank could not 
halt the run on loans. Loans increased $37^000 while 
deposits fell by $20,000.
From 1920 to 1923 the bank’s loan-deposit ratio 
remained over 120 percent. Although loans decreased 
after 1920, deposits did not increase enough to effec­
tively help the bank’s poor financial condition. In 
fact, from 1922 to 1923 the bank lost nearly $24^000 
in deposits; the loan to total deposits ratio reached 
the highest in the bank’s history--l67 percent.
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From 1910-1917 the individual deposits to total
9.0deposits ratio remained relatively stable.* However,
TABLE 8
Gilman State Bank (1910-1923)
INDIVIDUAL DEPOSITS TO 
TOTAL DEPOSITS RATIO
Individual Depo 
its to Total De
Total Individual posits
Year Deposits Deposits Ratio
1910 $ 23,183.81 .97
1911 36,039.27 .97
1912 35,682.54 .85
1913 40,972.81 .92
1914 - 55,349.44 .79
1915 45,225.78 .781916 See 44,499.29 .59
1917 Table 7 72,707.61 .601918 61,288.54 .471919 — - 84,659.43 .421920 56,934.61 .311921 5.1,709.36 .36
1922 59,459.56 .41
1923 24,061.01 .12
Gilman Condition Reports. June reports 1910-1923.
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as in the case of the loan-deposit ratio, the years 
after 1918 showed a significant change. In 193 8 the 
individual deposits total deposits ratio dropped 13 
percent from the preceding year. The next two years 
showed a steady decline, but by 1921 a reversal occurred 
and it looked as if the bank might recover. In 1923* 
though, the percentage of individual deposits to total 
deposits dropped by over two-thirds (from 41 percent to 
12 percent). This meant a monetary loss of over $25*000-- 
a loss too great from which to recover.
Another consideration in determining the bank’s 
failure was the adequacy of capital funds. To determine 
this a ratio of capital funds to total deposits is com­
piled. "Conventional thought during the 1920’s maintained 
that a 10 percent minimum was necessary for operating 
s a f e t y . This rule is illusory, however, for the
majority of Montana banks in 1921 and 1922 were in ex-
22cess of the ratio by 20 percent.
In compiling such a ratio the figures revealed a 
failure of the stockholders to maintain adequate capital 
to cover the liabilities in the bank. This capital was
21Elliott, "Commercial Bank Failures, 1920—1926,” 65.
22Ibid., 67.
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used "to establish confidence, and if this confidence 
/yiasj disturbed, the amount of capital not suffi­
cient to offset rapid deposit withdrawals."2^
The Gilman bank in comparison with other Montana 
banks from 1918—1923 had a very similar ratio.24 From 
1918 to 1922 the ratio was under 20 percent, but consid­
erably oyer the minimum 10 percent. The rapid withdrawal 
of money in 1923 caused a dramatic change in the capital 
to total deposits ratio. That year the bank recorded an 
increase of 4 percent from the previous year--the ratio 
reached 21 percent. The inadequate deposits in the Gil­
man Bank after 1918 caused the high ratio to be recorded.
2 ̂ Ibid., 66.
24 TABLE 9
Gilman State Bank (1918-1923)
CAPITAL FUNDS TO TOTAL 
DEPOSITS RATIO
Capital Funds to
Total Capital Total Deposits
Year Deposits Funds Ratio
1918 $ 25,000 .19
1919 - 25,000 .12
1920 See 25,000 .14
1921 Table 7 25,000 .17
1922 _ 25,000 .17
1923 25,000 .21
Gilman Condition Reports, June reports 1918-1923
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Ironically* in 1912 the bank purchased a book 
entitled How to Increase a Bank*s Deposits. The book 
proved to be of little value* though* for A. L. Bradley 
and his bank. "In 128 pages* /the book/ delineated 
eighteen ways to advertise. But in spite of the do-it- 
yourself approach aimed at increasing deposits, the
bank was better at loaning money than at attracting de-
2 Sipositors."
A final consideration of the bank's failure deal­
ing with deposits concerned the comparison of total 
deposits to total resources. The higher the proportion 
of ^total7  deposits to total resources, the higher the
leverage factor and* therefore* the profitability to
26the bank owners."
In the case of those banks that failed the ratio of 
deposits to resources was generally low. The same case 
can be made for the Gilman State Bank. After 1919 the 
bankfs total deposits were in a continual decline and
^^Toole* "Montana: A Twentieth Century Portrait," 52.
26Elliott* "Commercial Bank Failures* 1920-1926," 68.
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27so was its deposits to resources ratio. In 1922 the 
ratio fell to 54 percent and the last year of the bank's 
operation the ratio dropped to 50 percent. This compared 
with the state's 1923 ratio of 75 percent for all banks
n Qand a national ratio of 81 percent/ The profitability 
for the bank's owners reached such a low point that the 
only consideration was the bank's closure.
27 TABLE 10
Gilman State Bank (1918-1923)
TOTAL DEPOSITS TO 
RESOURCES RATIO
Total Deposits to
Total Resources
Year Deposits Resources Ratio
1918 $185,750.43 .71
1919 - 249,486.50 .81
1920 See 274,649.18 .67
1921 Table 7 235,049.52 .62
1922 263,973.21 .54
1923 237,867.95 .50
Gilman Condition Reports. June reports 1918-1923*
'28Elliott, "Commercial Bank Failures, 1920-1926," 70.
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III
Other financial factors besides deposits also 
played major roles in the collapse of the state bank 
in Gilman: dividends paid, the surplus account fund,
bills payable, and the state’s reserve requirement for 
all commercial banks. The years before 1920 did not 
show any significant change in the amount of yearly 
dividends paid. In 1916 stockholders received a 15 
percent dividend, in 1917 and 1918 a 10 percent dividend, 
and 15 percent in both 1919 and 1920. That last year 
$3>750 in dividends went to shareholders at $15.40 a 
share.^
After January 20, 1920, the bank did not pay a
single dividend. In 1922 a letter from C. W. Tewell to
one of the bank’s stockholders explained the predicament:
We did not declare any dividend ./this year? The 
directors thought it wise not to declare any un­
til times looked better. In view of the fact 
that we had very light crops during the last 
two or three years, together with the slump in 
prices on stock and grain, it has made it neces­
sary to carry a good many of our customers with 
principal and interest.3°
The last sentence lends credence to the problem the 
bank faced after 1920.' Since the Gilman bank foreclosed
2 97Gilman Condition Reports. June reports 1916-1923. 
30 Letter, Tewell to Reynolds, March 6, 1922, Gilman
papers.
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on only a small number of farmers Bradley and his asso­
ciates continued to extend credit to farmers and ranch­
ers. At the same time they did not force payment on de­
linquent loans. This caused a further breakdown in the 
financial spectrum.
The bank did not have enough money to pay the in­
terest on money borrowed from eastern banks. These banks 
in turn received pressure from their own stockholders 
to force payment. This resulted in eastern banks pleading 
with Bradley to meet his commitments. Bradley pleaded 
with his farmers and the latter pleaded with mother nature 
for relief.
A letter from the Wells-Dickey Company in Minneapolis 
illustrated the problem of all parties concerned. ,,Isntt 
there some way you can put a stick of dynamite under 
Heckman Bros, so they can produce some money soon? The 
insurance company to whom we have sold this loan is de­
manding ah early settlement." In concluding the firm 
underscored future action that would be taken. "We are 
fearful, unless the Heckmans get busy and make this pay­
ment at an early date, the insurance company will in­
struct us to commence immediate foreclosure. We should 
very much dislike to see this happen because it would 
cause additional expense and embarrassment to the Heckmans,
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as well as to all of ua."^
To compound matters the bankers and farmers were
under pressure from a different source as a 1923 letter
from Tewell to Lord denoted:
The winter wheat is practically ripe here now 
and its harvest is commencing this week. Farm­
ers coming in for repairs and twine have been 
told by the implement dealers that everything 
is cash on delivery. A representative of the 
International Harvester Co. was in the bank to­
day arid told us that this is the case all over 
the state.^2
The situation in no way made it any easier for the
Gilman farmers. Such a restriction for purchasing goods
forced the homesteaders to seek additional funds from
the bank so they could meet their daily operating expenses.
"The surplus account is of some importance as a
reflection of book earnings. Profits not distributed to
3 3owners are eventually charged to the surplus account." J 
Here again the Gilman bank is an excellent bank to ex­
amine .
The five years preceding 192 2 the bank religiously 
placed money in the surplus fund. The seven thousand
31Letter, Wells-Dickey to the Gilman State Bank,
Jan. 12, 1922, Gilman papers.
32Letter, Tewell to Lord, July 30, 1923; Gilman papers.
33Elliott, "Commercial Bank Failures, 1920-1926," 65.
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dollars used those years, added to the previous $3*000 
brought the total to $10,000. In 1922 and 1923 the 
bank ceased to operate with a profit and operated in the 
red. There was no excess profit, consequently no money
Tkcould be placed in surplus,''
TABLE II 
Gilman State Bank (1910-1923)
SURPLUS ACCOUNT
Added to Total in
Year Account Account
•1910 _ —
1911 — —
1912 — —
1913 — -
1914 $ 1,000 $ 1,000
1915 2,000 3,0001916 — 3,000
1917 1,000 4,0001918 1,000 5,000
1919 1,500 6,500
1920 1,500 8,000
1921 2,000 10,000
1922 — 10,000
1923 -
Gilman Condition Reports3 June reports 1910-1923,
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The amount of bills payable the bank possessed was 
also an indication of the institution*s stability. From 
1910 to 1916 the bills payable column remained relatively 
clear.^ After that the bank increased its bills payable 
until it reached a peak in 1921 of $55*000. The next 
two years the bank recorded reductions of $15*000 arid 
$13*000, but they were of no great consequence to halt 
the failing of the bank.
At the time the majority of Montana*s banks failed 
there was a state reserve requirement for both national 
and state banks. In a circular sent to all the banks
TABLE 12 
Gilman State Bank (1910-1923) 
BILLS PAYABLE
Year Bills Paya
1910 __
1911 -
1912 - ,
1913 -
1914 $ 10,000
1915 12,5001916 _
1917 10,000
1918 20,000
1919 15,0001920 52,500
1921 55*000
1922 39,900
1923 27,000
Gilman Condition Reports, June reports 1910-1923•
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in the state the bank Superintendent stated the reserve 
policy: "Every bank, except a reserve bank, shall main­
tain at all times a reserve of at least ten per centum 
of its deposit liabilities."8^
The problem of maintaining the required reserve 
proved to be a mammoth one for Montana banks. A. L. Brad­
ley in response to a letter from the Wells-Dickey Cor­
poration touched upon that problem. "You understand as 
well as we that conditions all over the state are not 
good and it is keeping the banks busy to keep up the re­
quired reserve."^
From 1918 to 1920 the Gilman bank maintained a very 
adequate reserve in proportion to its total deposits.88
8°Letter, State Department of Banking to all Montana 
banks, April 23> 1920, Gilman papers.
37 *Letter, Bradley to A. P. Morris, April 6, 1921,
Gilman papers.
38 TABLE 13
Gilman State Bank (1918-1923)
RESERVE TO TOTAL 
DEPOSITS RATIO
Total Reserve to Total
Year Deposits Reserve Deposits Ratio
1918 $ 16,888.98 .13
1919 - 31,598.35 .151920 See 21,354-96 .12
1921 Table 7 15,831.16 .11
1922 _ 16,291.12 .11
1923 ' 7,274-55 .06
Gilman Condition Reports, June reports 1918-1923*
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However, in 1921 the reserve to total deposits ratio 
dropped to 11 percent and remained at that level the 
following year. It could not be increased and fell 
drastically below the required 10 per cent. On the June 
condition report of 1923 the bank recorded a ratio of 
only 6 percent. Five months later on the final report 
of November 27, the day before the bank closed, the re­
serve to deposits ratio remained unchanged,^
On November 28, 1923, the board of directors of the 
Gilman bank considered the problem of the bank’s reserve 
and acted accordingly. ’’Realizing the reserve must be 
built up to the legal requirements the matter of a stock 
assessment was discussed. Inability of the stockholders 
to place new money in the bank, made an assessment value­
less. The prospect of closing the bank was taken up for 
discussion as it was the sense of the meeting the bank 
could not hope to build up its reserve. Naturally the 
motion was made, seconded and unanimously carried to 
close the bank.”^
The Gilman State Bank was a financially sound in­
stitution from 1910 to 1917. During this period it ade­
quately served, the needs of the farmers and ranchers 
in the Gilman area. The bank did not secure a sizable
39Ibid., Nov. 27, 1923.
^Minutes, Nov. 28, 1923, Gilman papers.
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profit but cleared enough each year so that an adequate 
dividend could be awarded the stockholders. When the 
grain growers and stockmen prospered so did the Gilman 
bank •
After the drought hit central Montana the small 
bank suffered along with its depositors. Loans increased 
at a rapid rate. Deposits fell and caused the loan- 
deposit ratio to soar. The bills payable could not be 
effectively reduced and money ceased to be placed in 
the surplus account. Most importantly the bank's capi­
tal stock was not increased nor was its reserves. The 
only alternative for the directors was to go into receiver­
ship in hopes of reopening the bank at a later date.
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CONCLUSION
The closure of the Gilman State Bank in 1923 
epitomized the failure of other Montana banks during 
the 1920*s. It was a small country bank run by in­
experienced personnel. It depended on homesteaders 
who lacked knowledge about western farming procedures. 
Worst of all, the bank was located in an area that 
relied on a marginal economy.
The dry years after 1917 caused a chain reaction 
of events. Falling agricultural prices forced Montana 
farmers to seek aid from their local banks. The banks 
in turn requested help from their correspondent banks 
in the East. These institutions granted the requests 
until their stockholders demanded repayment of the loans. 
This reversed the cycle, climaxed by the failure of 
hundreds of Montana banks and the bankruptcy of thou­
sands of the state’s farmers.
The Gilman bank was representative of this failure. 
Continual requests for loans from the local homesteaders 
caused a steady increase in the loan-deposit ratio. The 
bills payable could not be reduced. This forced the 
bank’s president to seek additional help from eastern 
correspondents. When this help was refused the Gilman
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bank could not maintain an adequate reserve and meet 
its financial commitments. Since other banks followed 
this procedure the collapse of the Gilman bank can be 
considered a typical example of a Montana bank failure.
The story of the Gilman bank is also unique because 
it involved the formation and collapse of a whole com­
munity. A. L. Bradley built the town of Gilman in con­
junction with the Great Northern Railroad. When the 
bank failed and the railroad was extended to Augusta in 
1923, Gilman residents deserted their community. They 
depended so much on Bradley and his bank that when either 
faltered the whole town suffered.
The town of Gilman is but a memory today. The bank 
building still stand^ but the only sounds heard on 
main street are the rustle of the tumbleweeds and the 
whistle of the wind. In its glory the community aspired 
to be the center of the Sun River Valley. It was led 
by an ambitiouis man who was outdone only by the fierce 
competition with nature— a battle few men could hope 
to win.
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